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As U.S. policymakers debate various approaches to  
reform the nation’s ailing health care system, efforts to 
improve quality and reduce costs have never received 
more attention. One potential solution that is gaining 
support is to restructure primary care practices to 
incorporate essential principles of the “patient-centered 
medical home” clinical delivery model. Some early 
evidence shows that aggressive clinical care coordination, 
intense communication with patients, concentrated 
adherence to evidence-based measures and attention  
to avoiding hospitalization results in better-quality 
care being delivered at a lower overall cost. The 
PROMETHEUS Payment model is designed to encourage 
these better care patterns and can support the creation 
and sustainability of medical homes.
By avoiding the pitfalls of current and past incentive 
models, payment can be reformed, and primary care 
practices can return to the solid and central place they 
deserve in a better American health care system. At the 
core is recognition that existing fee-for-service (FFS)  
and capitation-based payment systems encourage volume-
driven health care rather than value-driven health care. 
Providers are rewarded for “doing things” (either too 
many or not enough), rather than delivering quality 
services that are proven to keep people healthy, reduce 
errors and help avoid unnecessary care. 
In analyzing a large body of national claims data, 
the PROMETHEUS Payment developers found that a 
significant percentage of total cost of care spent today 
on six chronic diseases is attributable to “Potentially 
Avoidable Complications” (PACs). On average, close to 
half of total costs for these conditions are attributable 
to PACs, and they present a powerful mechanism to 
sustainably fund the patient-centered medical home 
model of care delivery. 
The PROMETHEUS Payment model presents a 
blueprint for physician payments based on packaging a 
comprehensive “episode” of medical care that covers all 
patient services related to a condition. The model uses an 
“Evidence-informed Case Rate®” (ECR), which creates a 
patient-specific, severity-adjusted prospective budget for a 
patient with a chronic condition. Each patient is assessed 
a budget based on his or her condition and its relative 
severity. These budgets can be added up across a specific 
patient population and represents a global budget for 
the physicians caring for these patients—irrespective of 
whether the physicians are incorporated in a “system.” 
Patients access care as they do now; physicians who care 
for the patients get paid under their current negotiated 
fee schedules; and all claims get accumulated against 
the prospective budget for each patient. At the end of 
the year, the actuals are compared to budgets, and any 
excess is the upside opportunity for the physicians. 
This report details how episode of care payment can be 
operationalized today, without any major disruption to 
payer or provider operations, or forced integration into 
“accountable care organizations,” and yield significantly 
improved margins for physicians that deliver coordinated, 
patient-centered care.
The current national health reform dialogue provides 
an opportunity to correct the deficiencies in health care 
value and usher in meaningful changes in the way we  
pay for care. The PROMETHEUS Payment model may 
serve as a viable example to effectively power the medical 
home concept, resulting in better patient outcomes and 
greater affordability of care. 
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sustaining the medical home:
How PROMETHEUS Payment® Can Revitalize Primary Care
Table of Contents 
Sustaining the Medical home
Introduction .................................................................................................2
Section 1: Avoiding the Mistakes of the Past ........................................5
Section 2: Hybrid Payment and Reconstituting Primary Care ...........8
Section 3: Analysis and Implications ....................................................12
Section 4: Operationalizing the Model ..................................................18
Section 5: Disclaimers .............................................................................21
Section 6: Conclusion .............................................................................. 23
technical appendix a
Discussion of Risk Bifurcation in Health Care .....................................24
technical appendix B
Chronic Care ECRs ................................................................................... 32
technical appendix c
Chronic Care Estimator........................................................................... 43
2
SUSTAInIng ThE MEdICAl hoME: how PRoMEThEUS PAYMEnT® CAn REVITAlIzE PRIMARY CARE
Introduction 
Health care services currently consume 17 percent of the U.S. 
Gross Domestic Product. Observers expect that share to reach more than 20 percent 
of GDP within a decade. And yet, in a sector of the economy that, in dollar terms, is 
doubling every 10 years, primary care physicians are in financial crisis. Seven years 
ago, many of the specialties that deliver primary care services sounded the alarm.i 
Employers, health plans and policymakers are now ready to take action, realizing that 
(1) the total number of physicians practicing in internal medicine, family practice and 
general practice has fallen dramatically in recent years and is predicted to continue 
to fall over the next decade;ii and (2) the fee-for-service (FFS) payment system 
blindly rewards both volume of services (not quality or results), and procedures 
over cognition. The willingness to confront the primary care crisis has also been 
accelerated by several factors:
  •   The ongoing distortions in Medicare’s Resource-Based Relative Value Scale 
(RBRVS) scale that compresses fees for cognitive services (what good patient 
management care is all about) in favor of procedural care and technological 
inputs;
  •   Increasing evidence of mediocre quality of care combined with escalating costs;
  •   The inexorable increase in chronic illness that demands far greater care coordination;
  •   The realization that the 15-minute primary care visit spawned by the FFS payment 
system cannot provide high-quality preventive, chronic and acute care.
As Congress prepares to address health reform, we offer a partial blueprint for a 
payment approach that, we believe, could guide, promote and support the sound, 
sustainable restructuring of primary care. It is focused around the principles of 
the “medical home” as a clinical care delivery model, based on over 40 years of 
theoretical work, and many years of analytical research and practical experimentation. 
Criticism of FFS is hardly new. In the 1960s, Dr. Jerry Solon was one of the first to 
express that paying for care by unit of service and creating accountability for costs at 
that level was irrational for many reasons. First, paying for the unit of service had no 
relationship to the way physicians and other clinicians think about and carry out patient 
treatment. Instead, he suggested that using a comprehensive episode of medical care 
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as a unit of measurement of costs would better reflect the actual practice of medicine.iii 
Since then, others have expanded on this concept. Most recently the National Quality 
Forum issued a Measurement Framework for Evaluating Patient-Focused Episodes of 
Care.iv In addition, the Geisinger Health System has, through its ProvenCare program, 
implemented a model in which physicians and hospitals are paid a global fee for all 
patient services related to a condition or a procedure. Geisinger also offers a limited 
“warranty” to payers, insulating them from the cost of mistakes or other care defects.
In 2006, the PROMETHEUS Payment® model was launched to develop and implement 
an episode of care payment effort with the goal of replacing much of FFS payment. It 
developed and analyzed a new type of episode—an “Evidence-informed Case Rate®” 
(ECR)—that can be used for chronic conditions, procedures and acute events, in all 
provider delivery settings. In analyzing large national claims data, PROMETHEUS 
developers found that a significant percentage of the total costs of care spent today 
on six chronic diseases was attributable to Potentially Avoidable Complications 
(PACs). On average, 40 percent of total costs for these conditions are attributable 
to potentially avoidable complications, and 15 to 30 percent of total costs for acute 
events and procedures are also attributable to PACs. Extrapolating to the nation 
across all procedures, acute events and chronic conditions, over $500 billion of the 
$2.4 trillion spent on health care services in the U.S. are potentially avoidable costs, 
although the extent to which these costs can be reduced in the short- medium- and 
long-term is as yet undetermined. This finding does not mean that the PROMETHEUS 
Payment® design expects that all complications will be avoided, nor does it deny 
payment for necessary care where complications occur. Rather, the analysis offers 
very clear data regarding where providers can focus their attention in changing care 
delivery, with the expectation that those changes can prevent some of these defects 
and thereby save money while simultaneously improving quality.
These PAC findings confirm the effects of fragmentation, lack of care coordination, 
quality deficiencies and, to an extent, the demise of primary care. However, they 
also point to a potentially powerful mechanism to sustainably fund what has become 
known as the Patient-Centered Medical Homes model of care delivery:  by harnessing 
the dollars spent on potentially avoidable complications as powerful incentives to 
manage patients more effectively. In essence, existing money can be distributed as 
new money to physicians without increasing the total dollars the system is spending. 
Consider a payment mechanism in which physicians, hospitals, home health care 
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agencies and other clinicians would keep a significant portion of that $500 billion, 
provided they reduced that amount over time. 
For us, a Patient-Centered Medical Home is any practice in which the care of the patient 
is delivered well, in accordance with evidence and best practices, is coordinated with 
other clinicians and caregivers and fundamentally meets the needs of the patients. 
There is a fair amount of research that indicates that reengineered practices which 
incorporate the essential principles of the Medical Home—aggressive clinical 
coordination of care, intense communication with patients, concentrated adherence 
to evidence and attention to avoiding hospitalizations—do, in fact, deliver better 
quality at a lower overall cost than non-reengineered practices.v To promote desired 
reengineering like a Medical Home, though, requires a payment approach that 
establishes incentives that depend on and reward good results. 
Unfortunately, none of the current payment methods alone, neither FFS nor capitation, 
will promote or sustain Medical Homes. We argue that simply developing a new, 
promising delivery system and hoping it eventually matches a payment method that will 
sustain it—is backward. Form should follow rather than lead the incentive structure. 
In this report, we explore the financing model for these clinical practices, 
point out some important lessons learned from the past and illustrate in 
practical terms how to reform payments and return primary care to the 
solid place it deserves in a better American health care system. We show 
how a hybrid approach that includes some FFS, some thin capitation and 
a significant share of payment oriented around ECRs would promote and 
sustain the Medical Home structure, provided that the Medical Home can, 
in fact, improve care and reduce defects.
We argue that simply develop-
ing a new, promising delivery 
system and hoping it eventually 
matches a payment method that 
will sustain it—is backward. 
Form should follow rather than 
lead the incentive structure. 
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Section 1: Avoiding the Mistakes of the Past
One of the fundamental flaws in past and existing payment models within an insurance-
based health care payment system has been the misallocation of risk between insurers, 
providers and consumers. With the advent of traditional managed care, theorists came 
to the correct conclusion that FFS leaves physicians in a riskless environment where 
they are shielded from the economic consequences of their decisions and indeed benefit 
from increasing costs to others. But the same theorists jumped to the wrong assumption 
for distributing the risk (discussed below). Because of that incorrect assumption, they 
formulated a concept of risk that alienated both consumers and physicians. Consumers 
were given limited choice in closed provider panels and through gatekeeping, while 
physicians found no clinical logic and the wrong risk in capitation. Given that lesson 
from managed care, when considering potential sustainable funding for Medical Homes, 
ideally one would find a reimbursement mechanism that delegates risk appropriately, 
while at the same time preserving patient choice.
Today, we find three major ways to pay for care. The table below lists them with their 
attendant incentives, organizational effects and effects on consumerism. They are:
  1. Fee for Service
  2. Capitation
  3. Global Fees, Case Rates, for Episodes of Medical Care
In exploring the specific effects of each payment method, it is important to understand 
that the nature and apportionment of risk in each is different. How different types of risk 
are distributed amongst the three main stakeholders—patients, providers, payers—has 
profound implications on their incentives and actions.1 As the recent financial crisis has 
shown, misunderstanding risk and how to adequately price and manage it can wreak 
havoc. This insight about apportionment of risk should guide policymakers in their 
deliberations of payment reform and help mitigate the negative effects of any proposed 
incentive scheme.
Payment Mode Core Incentive Organizational Effect
Consumer  
Shopping Effect
Fee-for-Service Increase volume Favors  
fragmentation
Can only shop for 
individual services
Capitation Decrease volume Favors consolidation Can only shop for 
“systems”
Episode Decrease volume  
w/in episode, 
increase volume  
of episodes
Favors some  
consolidation...  
at the disease/ 
procedure level
Can shop for 
“care packages” 
– relevant price 
transparency
  
1 For an in-depth discussion of risk, please see Appendix A – Discussion of Risk Bifurcation in Health Care, by Douglas Emery
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The predictability of risk manifests itself through variation in the 
price of services and goods. The less predictable risk is, the greater 
the variation in prices, because those who have to bear that risk will 
demand adequate compensation. As study after study has shown, 
there is tremendous variation in the total price of care, not simply 
from region to region, but within regions throughout the country.vi 
However, that variation is neither one-dimensional nor homogenous.viii
Prior research reveals that it is possible to identify three types of risk 
that drive this underlying variationviii: the risk that any patient at any 
point in time will develop an illness, have an accident or generally 
require medical services; the risk that physicians, hospitals and other 
health care services providers will make the wrong decisions and 
follow the wrong treatment pathways in managing patients; and the 
risk that patients will make the wrong decisions in seeking care or 
deciding upon which treatment pathway to follow. While there are clearly some inter-
dependencies between these three types of risks, we believe that the function of each 
stakeholder in the health care system suggests the following pattern for an appropriate 
distribution of risks:
While creating such an ideal balance is likely to take time and many experiments, it is 
important for payment reform proponents to understand how their models will impact 
the distribution of risks in the table above, and it is just as important to understand how 
current provider, payer and patients incentives impact the distribution. 
The patient’s portion of the risks will depend largely on their benefit design. For 
example, patients with high co-insurance will carry a significant portion of the risks 
that a medical event will occur, the risks related to the choices made by providers, 
and their own choices. Several experiments have shown that the choice of services 
is highly dependent on the price paid for the service—higher price leads to lower 
consumption.ix The risk created by patient choice is also manifest in what the Dartmouth 
University researchers have termed “preference-sensitive care.”x 
There are many provider actions that create variation in total cost of care and create 
incremental risk. We know from many studies that there are significant defects in the 
Because many of the chronic 
conditions addressed in the ECRs 
are being addressed by others as 
well, finding measures to score 
physicians on those conditions 
was not so difficult.
Type of Risk Payer Patient Provider
Risk that a medical event will occur 80% 10% 10%
Risk related to choices made by patients 10% 80% 10%
Risk related to choices made by providers 10% 10% 80%
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production of care services.xi These defects range from the seemingly benign—the 
failure of providing a recommended preventive screening—to the headline-grabbing 
tragedy—the graft of an incompatible blood-typed organ in a transplant patient. Other 
research has shown that demand for a specific treatment can be induced by the physi-
cian’s preference for a certain pathway, even when that pathway is not consistent with 
the patient’s needs.xii A well-designed payment model should shift the majority of these 
risks to providers.
Finally, to a certain extent, the likelihood of a costly medical event can be influenced 
by the actions (or inactions) of payers and purchasers. For example, the lack of patient 
education and activation might lead to more plan members becoming ill or acquiring 
a chronic disease. Similarly, creating barriers to accessing preventive care services or 
medication for the management of a chronic illness can greatly increase the severity of 
an episode of medical care. Importantly, and more simply, the risk that a medical event 
will occur is a core function of insurance, and the reason why consumers are willing to 
pay premiums. As such, it is the core risk that should be borne by payers and should 
not be shifted to the delivery system. A well-designed payment model should shift this 
risk to payers.
There are many factors in today’s health care marketplace that significantly increase 
these three risks, and therefore inflate the total price of care. One such example is in the 
incentives created by the benefit design of most health insurance programs (not least 
the Medicare program). For the most part, they continue to make the consumer almost 
completely insensitive to the actual price of care services, and distorts their choices. 
Similarly, FFS places the cost of all health care utilization into the hands of the payer 
and distorts technical risk. And the combination of FFS and non-value-based benefit 
design is the reason why costs of care have continued to outpace inflation. Conversely, 
capitation places the cost of the variation caused by both probability and technical risks 
in the hands of providers. In addition, capitation creates an inherent conflict between 
providers and patients because traditional capitation requires providers to control for both 
probability and technical risk, while blocking the expression of choice by patients.xiii
No matter how well intended, the effort to capitate providers radically lowers the total 
choice sets for consumers. We argue that to the extent that Medical Home funding 
is based on capitation, simply relabeling those narrowed sets of consumer choice as 
Medical Homes won’t help at all. Consumers will ultimately rebel. If past is prologue, 
attempts to channel patients towards optimal care pathways that do not permit their 
choice utilities to be taken into account will likely fail.
The patient has an important role in helping to hold the delivery system accountable 
for variation in costs. Unfortunately, the efforts to maximize the patient role will require 
more than simply using incentives to “steer” patients to reengineered Medical Homes. 
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Health care is the perfect example of what economists refer to as a co-produced good. 
Providers have only so much power to manage patients towards better care. If Medical 
Homes are to be sustainable, patient compliance must also be included in the incentive 
mix. This is especially true with regard to chronic conditions. Although we will not 
address benefits redesign in this paper, we do point out that understanding the reality 
of choice-utility risk is indispensable to making the system better.xiv At some point, Con-
gress must come to grips with the reality that Medicare benefits must be redesigned to 
turn beneficiaries into active partners in their care, not simply demanders of any service 
at any price.
Section 2: Hybrid Payment and Reconstituting Primary Care
Economists have learned that, generally, organizations rapidly respond to fiscal stimuli 
and incentives. Organizations will often quickly form to deliver the goods and services 
that are valued by those who are willing to purchase them. The U.S. health care delivery 
system has acted in a similar fashion, consolidating when the primary incentive has 
been global capitation, and fragmenting when it has been FFS. If we want primary care 
to be patient-centered and focused on delivering high-value, effective and efficient care, 
then those paying for care must do so in ways that stimulate that value. And, as history 
has shown, the payment design will refashion the delivery system to maximize incen-
tives within that payment method. 
In the initial development of the PROMETHEUS Payment® model, our design team gath-
ered input from large and small provider organizations on the critical elements necessary 
for a payment system that stimulates high-value care. Some of the themes that emerged 
are: encourage high-quality treatment of all patients irrespective of health status; avoid 
major, immediate economic disruption; and promote professionalism. These needs are 
also highly consistent with needs expressed by health plans and employers, although 
these stakeholders add two important needs: moderate the overall medical cost trend 
and minimize operational disruption. We believe that for a payment reform effort to 
succeed, it must find a way to meet the needs of both providers and payers, and it must 
also be respectful of the needs of consumers. Research on consumer attitudes towards 
health care has consistently shown that apart from wanting access to care at the lowest 
cost possible, the most important consumer need is the freedom to choose the physi-
cians who they want to manage their care.xv
Our review of the literaturexvi, along with the input from expert provider, employer 
and plan representatives, leads us to hypothesize that a hybrid payment approach that 
includes some residual FFS payments as well as bundled, episode-based payments, and 
what we call “thin” capitation to support reengineering work, is probably necessary. This 
approach would have the highest likelihood of both successfully driving high-value, and 
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being implemented. Such a hybrid approach should create an environment in which (1) 
providers are shielded as much as possible from probability risk, but are held accountable 
for technical risk; (2) consumers are free to choose the physicians they need for their 
care; and (3) providers, payers and patients are sensitive to the overall cost of care. 
Part One: Visit-Based FFS
Primary care physicians offer a variety of services focused on routine prevention, non-
emergent and non-chronic sick care. We argue that these kinds of services can and 
should be paid for on an FFS basis. Maintaining individual charges for these services 
will continue to allow for price and delivery system competition, which should result 
in greater value for the consumer, and can also lead to differential co-pays at the point 
of care (which further sensitizes consumers to the actual cost of services). While some 
have argued that these services could be bundled in an actuarially based per member, 
per month fee, that form of capitation inherently forces a lock-in of patients to a practice 
(which is undesirable for consumers), and prevents unit price transparency and com-
petition for the delivery of those services (which is inconsistent with value creation). 
The services that are best suited for FFS are either services with very low technical risk 
(e.g., treating the flu), or underused (e.g., immunizations), or used to treat conditions for 
which we can’t avoid complications (e.g., Parkinson’s disease). Noting that there con-
tinues to be a gap in the quantity of preventive services that should be delivered with 
what is currently delivered (despite the inducement for volume offered by FFS) a portion 
of these FFS payments should be tightly linked to quality scores. These scores should 
reflect not simply the adherence to recommended preventive care guidelines, but also 
ease of access to routine care services by patients – for example, the availability of after-
hours care for a child’s earache in order to avoid unnecessary visits to the emergency 
department.
Retaining this sort of FFS in primary care would also allow for a smoother glide path 
towards revitalizing it, and would assure physicians and their business managers that 
the motion towards a reengineered practice will not require overnight transformation. It 
would allow time for primary care practices to identify areas that require critical change, 
latitude for execution including the inevitable mistakes and some space for accommodat-
ing change. Furthermore, the FFS claims billing and payment systems can continue to be 
used to funnel information on the volume and type of services practices provide, both of 
which are essential to understand both technical risk and overall cost of care.
Part Two: PROMETHEUS Payment® ECR®s2
Beyond each of the services that are paid for discretely and separately, much of the care 
in ambulatory settings, and especially care that includes internal medicine, family and 
general practices, can be bundled into episodes. Well-designed episodes would include 
all the services informed by best practices, expert opinion and clinical guidelines to 
treat the patient optimally. In 2007 and 2008, PROMETHEUS Payment® Inc. developed 
  
2 For a description of the methodology used to create an Evidence-informed Case Rate (ECR), see Appendix B – Chronic Care ECRs, by Dr. Amita Rastogi
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a series of ECR®s for chronic conditions: (1) diabetes, (2) coronary artery disease, (3) 
hypertension, (4) asthma, (5) heart failure and (6) chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease. In the PROMETHEUS Payment® model, the negative consequences of technical 
risk are defined as “potentially avoidable complications”, or PACs. Examples of PACs 
in patients admitted to a hospital for an acute myocardial infarction might include 
medication error and phlebitis. For patients with chronic conditions, PACs include 
hospitalizations related to the condition. Typical care is care that is recommended by 
expert opinion or guidelines.
To create ECRs, PROMETHEUS Payment® Inc. assembled working groups to develop 
criteria for building ECRs in several clinical areas, including cancer care, chronic care, 
interventional cardiology and orthopedic care. The result of this effort was published in 
a report.xvii These groups modeled ECRs for episodes of care that include both inpatient 
and outpatient services.xviii 
Here’s how ECRs work.xix To care for a patient diagnosed with a spe-
cific condition, a risk-adjusted global budget is established. This budget 
covers all services recommended by well-accepted clinical guidelines 
or expert opinions.xx It includes all of the care required for treatment 
delivered by physicians, hospitals, laboratories, imaging centers, phar-
macies, rehabilitation centers and other providers. For chronic condi-
tions, the time window of the services is the same as the plan member’s 
benefit year. As a result, this type of fully priced episode of care can 
give consumers a means for more effective comparative shopping.
We designed the ECRs to separate the quantity and types of services 
that are routine or typical and evidence-informed, from the quantity 
and type of services caused by PACs. The ECR includes an allowance 
for PACs, which is added in proportion to the severity-adjusted base 
price. For example, if the base ECR price for a congestive heart failure 
(CHF) ECR is $5,000, the PAC allowance might be $4,000. And if the 
base ECR price for a CHF ECR is $10,000, the PAC allowance might be 
$8,000. This creates a de facto warranty, because providers in the PROMETHEUS Pay-
ment® system essentially warrant that they will reduce the expected PAC costs. While 
some providers are concerned that PACs cannot be avoided, each provider—whether a 
single internist, a hospital or an integrated health system—is not expected to act alone. 
In fact, the model places a strong emphasis on care coordination, including clinical col-
laboration among providers. And it does so through financial incentives. 70 percent of 
any provider score turns on what he or it does, but 30 percent of the scores depend on 
what every other provider treating the patient for the same condition does.xxi Because 
the ECR always includes this PAC allowance, providers ultimately win or lose financially 
based on their actual performance in reducing the incidence of avoidable complications. 
Whether or not adding back half of the total PACs is reasonable or should be increased 
(e.g., adding back 75 percent) will be determined during the pilot implementations.
While some providers are 
concerned that PACs cannot 
be avoided, each provider—
whether a single internist, a 
hospital or an integrated health 
system—is not expected to 
act alone.
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Importantly, the PROMETHEUS Payment® work shows that chronic care ECRs, while 
defined at the patient level (e.g., each ECR is adjusted for the patient for whom it has 
been triggered), can create the appearance of an overall global fee for a practice as 
illustrated in the table below:
In this example, the practice’s overall chronic care patient budget is $2,094,182 
including $565,203 as a combined allowance for PACs that could occur to any patient. 
The extent to which the practice can minimize technical risk will determine its profit-
ability. However, the practice also has an opportunity to increase margins simply by 
more efficiently allocating internal resources—in other words, redesigning processes, 
redeploying personnel, using more effective communication with patients—so that the 
$1,528,979 allocated to typical and evidence-informed services yields the highest return. 
For example, if the practice were to use group visits, or focus the physician’s attention 
on the patients at highest risk of hospitalizations, while having the other patients closely 
monitored by physician assistants and nurse practitioners, the actual cost for the practice 
of delivering optimal care to the patients might be significantly lower than the typical 
portion budgeted. 
Paying primary care practices—Medical Homes—using ECRs is designed to achieve 
exactly this type of efficient resource allocation and accountability for technical risk.
Part Three: Per-member-per-month Fee—or an Advance Against the Future Reductions in PACs
Asking physicians in small practices to self-invest in care reengineering; based on faith 
that PAC rewards are coming, is a very difficult value proposition. There is a time-phased 
transformation gap that could leave them vulnerable to financial risk with no real assur-
ance that payers will make good on realized PAC gains. Conversely, in a severe economic 
downturn, asking employers to fund capital investments in practices simply on the hope 
that savings will accrue is an equally difficult value proposition. Well-designed incentives 
should energize and catalyze provider motivation for change, while giving employers and 
plans the assurance that the investment will be tied to a measurable return. 
Total ECR
Typical Portion  
of the ECR
PAC Allowance
A = B + C B C
COPD $60,154 $39,701 $20,452
Diabetes $387,637 $255,840 $131,797
CHF $190,208 $125,537 $64,671
Asthma $136,182 $89,880 $46,302
CAD $271,298 $179,057 $92,241
HTN $1,048,704 $838,963 $209,741
Overall $2,094,182 $1,528,979 $565,203
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Using some measures of per member per month (PMPM) payment as an allowance 
against the future reduction in PACs achieves the dual aim of defraying some of the 
practice’s investment costs, while tying the fixed fee to quantifiable savings. Using the 
example above, a portion of the $565,203 in PAC allowance could be paid to the pri-
mary care practice as a fixed PMPM. And during the year-end reconciliation of all ECR 
payments, the fixed fee paid would be reduced from any net gain owed the practice. 
This schema would motivate payers and providers to work collaboratively to ensure that 
those gains are realized. Ultimately, as the transformation of the practice takes hold, the 
PMPM would disappear.
Ideally, the size of the PMPM fee should be based on an analysis of current practice cash 
flows, liabilities versus assets, fixed versus variable costs, amortized investments needed 
to realize the transformation, and workflow disruption and transformation costs.
Section 3: Analysis and Implications
While the medical literature has ample evidence of care defects, there is little infor-
mation attaching a dollar value to those defects. And yet, it is the ability to quan-
tify and monetize defects that will be critical if we are ever going to reduce 
them. There are two central questions to be answered in analyzing the potential 
effects of a new payment mix in Medical Homes: what are the levels at which the 
Medical Home might be financially and organizationally sustainable?
Some health care services researchers have argued that only large medical groups or 
integrated systems are organizationally adept enough to manage patients and become 
accountable for results.xxii Others have recently proposed that only organizations with a 
minimum number of Medicare beneficiaries (around 5,000) could be held accountable 
for the management of those patients.xxiii And yet economists have long argued that form 
is far less important than function in delivering value, and that incentives will shape 
organizations.
In our analyses of ECRs, we have focused on the functional approach, trying to 
understand how incentives can be created in a way that would encourage continuous 
reductions in care defects, and how those incentives could drive physicians to organize 
themselves to deliver better results in the management of patients. What we have found 
is that a practice with as few as 150 patients with chronic illnesses could, at the very 
least, break even if the practice was compensated for those patients according to the 
ECR formula.
To arrive at this conclusion, we ran the chronic care ECRs through several large claims 
databases. One database was national in scope and had over 4 million commercial-
ly insured plan members. Three others were from existing or nascent PROMETHEUS 
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Payment® pilot sites, and yet another was from a large employer. The results have 
been striking in their consistency. Despite the geographic diversity of the populations 
studied, the proportion of potentially avoidable complications as a percentage of total costs 
averages 40 percent for the six chronic care conditions studied. 
There are, however, significant variations in that proportion from condition to condition, 
and there are also significant variations in the total average annual cost of care from 
condition to condition and between regions. However, the stability of the overall average 
proportion of PACs as a percentage of total costs provides us with the financial mecha-
nism that we need to construct the right incentives for primary care practices. Indeed, 
the analysis suggests we have developed a sustainable way to encourage practices to 
become and stay Medical Homes.
The table below summarizes the findings from the national database. It shows the extent 
to which resources are consumed today in potentially avoidable costs, mostly coming 
from the lack of optimal management of patients. If anything, the table illustrates the 
critical importance of reforming the delivery of care and the significant potential that it 
has to control total costs of care. That is because the reduction in PACs both enhances 
patient outcomes and reduces costs. 
CHF CAD Diabetes Hypertension COPD Asthma Total
# Unique  
Patients
48,878 283,503 218,541 1,287,521 97,051 148,597 2,084,091
Total Costs $1,332,774,251 $1,976,867,847 $1,327,961,414 $5,148,045,540 $323,850,300 $265,542,677 $10,375,042,030
Total Typicala $409,503,974 $1,554,887,036 $515,155,654 $3,447,047,314 $205,372,583 $186,812,031 $6,318,778,592
Typical staysc $121,387,679 $121,387,679
Typical  
Professionald
$199,648,710 $687,316,269 $107,958,209 $1,092,100,766 $82,441,046 $55,297,065 $2,224,762,066
Typical  
Pharmacye
$209,855,264 $746,183,088 $407,197,445 $2,355,967,599 $122,931,536 $131,789,770 $3,973,924,702
Total PACb $923,270,277 $421,980,811 $812,805,760 $1,700,998,226 $105,450,034 $78,730,646 $4,043,235,754
PAC staysc $810,313,802 $137,605,423 $333,447,513 $954,045,079 $65,919,822 $31,511,481 $2,332,843,120
PAC  
Professionald
$86,376,772 $252,800,887 $154,162,385 $624,850,878 $26,180,770 $34,521,219 $1,178,892,911
PAC Pharmacye $26,579,703 $31,574,501 $325,195,862 $122,102,269 $13,349,443 $12,697,946 $531,499,724
% Dollars in 
Typicala
30.73% 78.65% 38.79% 66.96% 63.42% 70.35% 60.90%
% Dollars  
in PACb
69.27% 21.35% 61.21% 33.04% 32.56% 29.65% 38.97%
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of the ECR models from data published by PROMETHEUS Payment on www.PROMETHEUSpayment.org
aTypical services are services that are defined by PROMETHEUS Payment as being relevant and appropriate in the treatment of patients with the studied condition
bPAC services are services that are considered by PROMETHEUS Payment as related to a potentially avoidable complication
cStay costs only include the facility costs
dProfessional services include services that are related to the stay as well as services not associated to a stay
ePharmacy costs are all costs reported in the database and related to the purchase of prescription drugs through pharmacies
CHF is Congestive Heart Failure, CAD is Coronary Artery Disease, COPD is Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease 
Chronic Care ECR Summary Costs
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The keys to the construction of ECRs are (1) right-sizing the core bundle of services 
that are needed to manage patients (as informed by expert opinion and guidelines); 
(2) severity-adjusting at the patient level so that patients with more comorbidities get 
a greater core bundle (e.g., more physician visits and lab tests); (3) adding a severity-
adjusted allowance for PACs. The following illustration shows the range of ECR prices 
that can emerge from the analysis of CHF patients.
Importantly, the process of creating a core set of evidence-informed services in the ECR 
caused us to price a base set of services at $3,600. Our observations in the national 
database we initially used to create the ECRs indicated that the average core services paid 
for CHF averaged $1,300, or $2,300 in fewer services than what the evidence suggests 
should be delivered. This identified underuse, in and of itself, creates the opportunity 
for higher payments for physicians.
These numbers, however, mean little by themselves. In order for payment based on 
ECRs to be more favorable to a primary care practice than the current system, it should 
yield higher margins, not simply an appropriate allocation of services to care for the 
patient. These margins would compensate the practice for its investment in reengineer-
ing care processes, and create a far more attractive financial environment for physicians 
to practice general internal medicine and family practice.
Total ECR Price = Type of Services x Frequency x Price per Service
Based on 50% of  
current PAC rate
Arrived at through step-wise  
multi-variable regression model
Informed by guidelines and  
empirical data analysis
Currently based at 10% of typical
Adjusts ECR for local patterns
PAC  
Allowance $3,000 – $16,500
$360 – $2,260
CHF ECR Range** 
$7,000 – $41,400
$3,600 – $22,600*
Severity- 
Adjusted  
Core
Margin
* $2,300 was added to the base set of claims-based/observed services to create a right-sized evidence-informed set of services.
** The upper range can be greater than the amount stated depending on the severity of the patient.
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In analyzing the national database, we estimated the average total typical cost for a 
year of CHF care at $4,100 per patient. The illustration of the CHF ECR above indicates 
that the base payment for a CHF patient would be $7,000. The average would, in fact, 
be about $12,000 (the actual amounts would depend on the actual severity of the CHF 
patients), or three times the current average.
There is, however, a catch. Included within the $12,000 is an allowance for potentially 
avoidable complications—the warranty we discussed previously. It is within this essen-
tial warranty that the potential reward—and the risk—of the PROMETHEUS Payment® 
model lies. If the practice can deliver good results, manage patients optimally and 
reduce avoidable complications, it can reap a sizable reward. If, on the other hand, it 
fails to improve its results, it can suffer a loss. So what is this risk of loss likely to be?
To answer that question, we constructed a series of simulations3 that included building 
a risk profile of patients that mimicked the 4 million members in the national database 
and a randomization of those factors in a physician’s patient panel; creating tables that 
contain the distributions of PACs by observed frequency and associated costs, and a 
randomization of those PACs by patients in a physician’s panel. We also made certain 
assumptions relative to the ability of a physician to reduce PACs, and the investments—
both fixed and variable—necessary to reengineer care. Finally, we modeled a distribu-
tion of patients within a practice that was consistent with the distribution of chronic 
conditions within the national database.
All these variables can be changed in the simulation model so that, ultimately, it can 
be used in any region and with any practice to more specifically analyze the impact of 
moving to an ECR payment mechanism. In the example below, we use a core patient 
panel of 1,500 patients, slightly over 50 percent of whom have chronic conditions:
Patient Counts
COPD 40
Diabetes 80
CHF 16
Asthma 112
CAD 112
HTN 496
Overall 856
3 For a description of the simulation model, please see Appendix C – Chronic Care ECR Estimator, by Guy D’Andrea and colleagues at Discern Consulting.
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Using the simulator, we then determined how much the practice would receive, both 
with ECRs and separately with FFS. The difference, labeled “bonus opportunity,” 
includes both the allowance for right-sizing the core evidence-informed services for each 
ECR and the allowance for PACs. The table below summarizes the numbers:
The next step in the simulation is to determine both a fixed (e.g., new staff) and 
variable investment (e.g., care coordination) the practice would have to make in the 
very first year of the implementation in order to improve care. While these assump-
tions can be changed at will, we used the best available information to estimate these 
costs.xxiv We also estimated the potential impact these investments would have on the 
practice’s ability to reduce PACs. From those estimates, we created some fairly conserva-
tive projections of the practice’s ability to reduce PACs in the short-term in the 16 - 17 
percent range, although the existing literature does show that, on average, PACs for these 
chronic conditions can be reduced by about 36 percent. The table below summarizes the 
assumptions and their implications for the practice:
Average  
ECR Price
Average FFS  
Payments
Per Patient  
“Bonus”  
Opportunity
Total “Bonus”  
Opportunity
Total ECR  
Payments
COPD $1,504 $550 $954 $38,143 $60,154 
Diabetes $4,845 $2,016 $2,829 $226,321 $387,637 
CHF $11,888 $5,117 $6,771 $108,340 $190,208 
Asthma $1,216 $817 $399 $22,364 $136,182 
CAD $2,422 $1,257 $1,166 $130,538 $271,298 
HTN $2,114 $1,462 $652 $323,604 $1,048,704 
Overall $3,303 $1,606 $849,309 $2,094,182
Fixed  
Investment to 
Avoid PACs
Variable  
(per patient)  
Investment to 
Avoid PACs
Total Variable  
Investment to 
Avoid PACs
PAC  
Avoidance 
Effort
Predicted  
PAC Rate
PACs Incurred
COPD
$50,000
$100 $4,000 19% 37% $21,941 
Diabetes $200 $16,000 16% 53% $176,837 
CHF $1,000 $16,000 22% 51% $97,389 
Asthma $50 $2,800 22% 26% $4,619 
CAD $100 $11,200 18% 23% $36,742 
HTN $50 $24,800 17% 27% $71,094 
Overall $50,000 $74,800 $408,621 
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Bringing all these assumptions together completes the picture of the net benefit that 
could accrue to the practice and is summarized below:
As such, even after an investment of close to $125,000, the practice still stands to achieve 
a significant net benefit from the more effective management of its patients—here a 
net benefit of $316,000 compared to FFS. And while this net benefit will increase or 
decrease based on the actual cost and frequency of PACs, it is clear that the benefits that 
accrue to the practice are closely—and mathematically—tied to the benefits that would 
also accrue to payers and to the patients. And while this might sound utopian, it can be 
a reality.
What is a minimum number of patients necessary to cover the fixed costs of practice 
transformation? That number appears to be around 150, significantly less than the 5,000 
advanced by some health care services researchersxxv, and a number that should be 
within reach of most primary care practices across the country. 
Another concern about this approach would be that severity-adjustment cannot be done 
adequately when you only have two patients with CHF. That concern is valid if the 
severity adjustments were formulated on the basis of those patients, but they’re not. 
The severity adjustments are performed on large cohorts of patients of a plan within 
a certain region and representative of the severity of that patient population. Then the 
actual ECR price for patients managed by any given physician is based on the profile of 
those patients.
If one combines normal FFS payments for all the services not covered by ECRs and ECR-
based compensation for the six chronic conditions, most practices should be able to finance 
the development of their Medical Home. Given the enactment of the HITECH portion of 
Total “Bonus” 
Opportunity
Fixed Investment 
to Avoid PACs
Variable  
Investment to 
Avoid PACs
PACs Incurred
Net  
(Compared  
to FFS)
A B C D E = A - B - C - D
COPD $38,143 
$50,000
$4,000 $21,941 $12,201 
Diabetes $226,321 $16,000 $176,837 $33,485 
CHF $108,340 $16,000 $97,389 ($5,049)
Asthma $22,364 $2,800 $4,619 $14,944 
CAD $130,538 $11,200 $36,742 $82,596 
HTN $323,604 $24,800 $71,094 $227,710 
Overall $849,309 $50,000 $74,800 $408,621 $315,888 
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the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, most primary care phy-
sicians should qualify for close to $50,000 in incentives from Medicare 
to purchase an EMR. However, many small practices might lack the 
human resources needed to improve care for patients and, importantly 
in a PROMETHEUS® model, start reducing PACs. It is to that end that 
we are also proposing a PMPM that would be based on an anticipated 
reduction of PACs. This monthly allowance would be negotiated be-
tween the payer and the practice and understood to be an advance 
payment of the net benefit calculated above. So in the example above, 
the payer could create a $10 PMPM—which comes out to $60,000 a 
year—which would come in reduction of the net benefit that accrues 
to the practice at the end of the year. The payer would be taking a 
risk that the practice is unable to even minimally reduce PACs, but that payer could 
also mitigate that risk by actively collaborating with the practice to (a) accelerate the 
transformation, and (b) help improve care. In fact, in this hybrid model, payers and 
providers share a common interest in reducing PACs and improving the quality of care 
delivered to patients.
This model shows that probability and technical risk can be separated and “packaged” 
in a rational way that is manageable by the parties holding that risk. Payers manage 
probability risk by pricing premiums, and, ultimately, providers manage technical risk 
by pricing ECRs. However, between the FFS world we live in today and a future state in 
which physicians and hospitals can price their own ECRs and offer them to payers and 
patients, we need to find an operational mechanism that maintains the incentives while 
still being simple to manage. It is that mechanism we discuss in the next section.
Section 4: Operationalizing the Model
Simplicity and effectiveness in launching a new payment model is critical. First, health 
plans will not wholesale change their claims, contracting and benefit systems without 
the solid proof that the benefit of doing so will exceed its likely cost. Second, physicians 
and hospitals are as wedded to the current FFS claims systems as plans. All existing 
billing systems in physician offices are based on standard claims codes, and changing 
those processes will not only be disruptive, but could also lead to many unintended 
consequences. Further, as discussed in the first section, it is important in this evolution 
of a new payment model to maintain the flow of data that can help account for where 
and on what claims dollars are spent.
Payers manage probability 
risk by pricing premiums, and, 
ultimately, providers manage 
technical risk by pricing ECRs.
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So how can we maintain the desired effect of an ECR-based compensation while 
continuing payment on FFS schedules? We have found we can do this by prospec-
tively budgeting the ECRs, paying all claims FFS, and then doing a retrospective 
reconciliation. The illustration below shows how the claims and dollars would flow in 
a simplified process:
Picking up the example and tables in the prior section, the $2 million total across the 
850 ECRs for the practice is prospectively budgeted based on data from the payer for the 
prior year. Then, during the course of the year, as claims are routinely filed by providers 
and paid by plans, they are then funneled to the ECR Budget Tracker. The Tracker then 
accumulates all the claims relevant to any patient-specific ECR. Any claim hitting an 
ECR would either fall into the Typical bucket or the PAC bucket, depending on the ECR 
algorithms. At the end of the year, all the dollars in each bucket, in each ECR and across 
ECRs are summed up and reconciled.
Let’s assume that for the ECRs listed in the prior section, the actual dollars spent on 
typical care are as expected, but PACs are slightly higher than expected. Overall, there 
is still a net benefit as shown in the following table:
Hospitals
Payer
Physicians
ECR Budget 
Tracker
Rx
Other
Claims
 Paid 
Claims
$$ ECR Actual 
to Budget
Total ECR
Typical Claims 
Incurred
PACs Incurred Net Benefit
A B C D = A - B - C
COPD $60,154 $35,731 $21,941 $2,481 
Diabetes $387,637 $255,840 $176,837 ($45,040)
CHF $190,208 $125,537 $97,389 ($32,718)
Asthma $136,182 $89,880 $4,619 $41,682 
CAD $271,298 $179,057 $36,742 $55,500 
HTN $1,048,704 $838,963 $71,094 $138,647 
Overall $2,094,182 $1,525,008 $408,621 $160,552 
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So now comes the question that seems to baffle academics and practitioners alike: How 
do you divvy up the spoils if there isn’t an integrated system or a formal group? What 
happens when the delivery system is fragmented, and patients are seen by different 
independent physicians? How can this possibly work if the patients aren’t force- 
attributed to a specific practice or some sort of accountable entity?
The answer is simple—it works like it works today. In the FFS world, patients are 
not forced into an attribution, there are no gatekeepers and no complex financial 
arrangements among physicians practicing independently. The practical reality is that in 
an environment in which ECRs are budgeted prospectively (not paid prospectively) and 
reconciled retrospectively, the main issue is how to divvy up the net benefit to the extent 
there is one. We see two reasonable answers:
   a.  The physicians who commonly manage the patients together agree on a formula 
to split the upside, to the extent there is one. This is another potential aspect of 
collaboration. From the prior year’s claims data, we have an understanding of which 
physicians cared for each patient, and can thus create a “one to many” attribution—
essentially all the physicians touching the patient are jointly responsible for the 
outcome. The question of who “manages” the patient is moot and should not matter 
that much. After all, during the course of the year, a patient might need to be man-
aged variously by, for example, the internist and the cardiologist. The incentives 
should not, in any way, create a conflict in providers deciding what is best for the 
patient. When compensation is ECR-based, physicians will always do better when 
they collaborate—integrating their clinical management of shared patients—which 
is not synonymous with formally integrating their actual practices. The formula that 
they agree on can be simply communicated to the plan.
   b.  The physicians who commonly manage the patients do not formally agree on a 
method to split the net benefit. In that instance, we recommend that the split be 
done as a function of the proportion of encounters observed in the typical portion 
of the dollars spent. The table below illustrates how that calculation would be done 
for the patients in our example:
% of Total  
E&M claims
Share of Bonus
Dr. Machado – Internist 40% $64,221
Dr. Rastogi – Cardiologist 30% $48,166
Dr. Emery – Pulmonologist 15% $24,083
Dr. Brown – Nephrologist 15% $24,083
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Whether option (a) or option (b) is in place—and physicians should choose their 
approach—the actual disbursement of funds would be similar to the table above. For 
any particular cohort of patients, the distribution of these dollars can change. And 
for any of the physicians listed above, their net benefit across all the ECRs they are 
co-managing would have a very different view. For example, in addition to the $64,221 
listed above, the internist might get some additional net benefit from a cohort of patients 
for which he is mainly a consultant and not the principal physician (as could be the case 
for the patients in our current example). Similarly, the pulmonologist is likely to be the 
principal clinician for some COPD patients and would therefore receive the majority of 
the net benefit for those patients.
Ultimately, this approach will reward the physicians who collaborate with each other to 
actively reduce PACs for any patients they manage. If they don’t explicitly collaborate, 
then the likelihood of reducing PACs will be much smaller, and they will not opti-
mize either their own self-interest or the interests of the payers and the patients—all 
of which are aligned here. Furthermore, using the names in our prior example, if Dr. 
Rastogi systematically fails to communicate with Dr. Machado and, as a consequence, 
Dr. Machado’s CAD and CHF patients are incurring PACs at a high rate, then Dr. 
Machado has strong incentives to start referring his patients to a cardiologist who will 
want to actively co-manage patients.
In that light, there is no clear incremental benefit to be gained by prematurely 
forcing or even, necessarily, either (1) promoting some sort of defined 
organizational or financial integration, or in (2) limiting participation in 
the payment model to integrated medical systems. As we’ve shown, here, 
forcing the shape of the delivery system ahead of the development of an 
incentive structure that rewards care coordination and high value is not 
necessary. In fact it could even have unintended, unfortunate side effects. 
For instance, if we force integration, physicians might waste valuable time 
attempting to organize into complicated entities instead of focusing on 
rapidly improving care for patients. As we’ve advocated elsewhere in this 
document, we should not let the shape of the delivery system dictate the 
terms of a payment model, but rather let the payment model shape the 
delivery system.
Section 5: Disclaimers
This is not meant to be a position or white paper, but a potential guide for payers and 
providers to use for both payment and clinical practice transformation through the use 
of ECRs. However, this guide is about potential and therefore is untested, so it comes 
with some disclaimers. 
...We should not let the 
shape of the delivery system 
dictate the terms of a  
payment model, but rather 
let the payment model shape 
the delivery system.
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First and foremost, we don’t know if this hybrid payment approach will promote and 
sustain reengineered primary care. Designing new payment models in a highly complex 
system like health care is daunting at best, and no one can seriously pretend that a 
proposed formula is “The Formula.” 
Second, as in all new product or service designs, the most important part of the process 
is to minimize the potential failures and process breakdowns. We believe we have paid 
close attention to where this model will perform well. For example, we believe that 
continuing to leverage the current FFS system will avoid piling significant operational 
risks on payers and providers alike, and will provide us all with the time to closely 
analyze the impact of the new incentives. However, we might find that the behavior 
change might not be as profound as it would be if the financial risk were significantly 
higher—which it would be if we moved right away to prepaid episodes.
Third, our work suggests that some primary care practices might find it easier to improve 
care for patients with some of the six chronic conditions we’ve studied than for patients 
with others. For example, practices might find it much easier to improve hypertension 
care than diabetes care. Practices might, then, have an incentive to participate in some 
ECRs rather than others. To that end, we have recommended that practices not be 
allowed to select ECRs, rather, they must accept any ECR that applies to their patients.
Fourth, we are making a broad assumption that small practices will find the technical 
resources to help them reengineer. We believe that those resources are important. We 
also recognize that the development of those improvement resources is a significant 
challenge and not currently widely available. We do believe that payment models like 
PROMETHEUS Payment® ECRs highlight and intensify the urgent need for those kinds 
of improvement resources. 
Beyond these limitations, it is important to note that we have not 
addressed here how quality is measured in this payment model. 
There is, however, a companion report published by PROMETHEUS 
Payment®, Inc. (“What’s the Score?”xxvi) that explains how the 
comprehensive scorecard based on the practice’s medical record data 
will be constructed and used to manage the net benefit distributed to 
the practice. Ultimately, data from medical records should be used not 
simply for constructing the quality scorecard, but also to help better 
inform the severity adjustments of any ECR.
It is also important to note again that payers need to address plan 
member benefit design as a core complement to a payment model that 
includes ECRs. Benefit packages that complement value-based payment 
models will help mitigate the negative effects of choice-utility in the 
current benefit design environment. Patient compliance is critical in any 
payment environment where providers assume technical risk. Policy-
makers need to understand that failure to address this patient role will lead to contin-
ued conflicts between payers and providers relative to which portions of PACs can be 
reasonably reduced without full patient engagement.
Designing new payment models 
in a highly complex system like 
health care is daunting at best, 
and no one can seriously  
pretend that a proposed  
formula is “The Formula.” 
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Section 6: Conclusion
We have a unique opportunity in the current national health reform discussion—along 
with the emerging consensus that any successful reform must correct the health care 
value equation. Further, many also understand that to correct the current value dysfunc-
tion, it will be necessary to launch meaningful changes in the way we pay for care. 
For primary care, this is an emergency. The clinical promise of the Medical Home will 
be unachievable if the financial model supporting it does not drive toward both im-
proved results for patients and dollars saved in the overall system. We believe the use of 
ECRs and PACs in the hybrid payment model we have described is uniquely positioned 
to sustain the Medical Home, revitalize primary care, create a business case for it and 
save money as well.
The PROMETHEUS Payment® pilot work supported by the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation is yielding evidence that may help payers learn how to package risk and 
create payment incentives that, in turn, could yield positive results for all stakeholders. 
Perhaps by using some of the basic payment principles outlined here, health care can 
indeed function like other industries where proper incentives, resources and informa-
tion, promote rigorous and ongoing reduction in defects that actually does increase the 
value for all. For primary care, we think this is imperative.
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technical aPPendiX a
Discussion of Risk Bifurcation in Health Care
Doug Emery, M.S.
Probability risk is fundamentally different from technical risk. There are five reasons for 
this, which the bulk of this section will explain. First, it’s priced in a radically different 
way. Since probability risk is about pricing uncertain future events, it’s primarily a gross 
aggregated statistical artifact—what happens with large populations in the past is the 
best likely predictor of what will happen to the same populations in the future. This 
makes pricing probability risk the mathematical domain of actuaries. Technical risk, on 
the other hand, is about pricing clinically integrated episodes of care, which makes it 
the productive domain of physicians and other allied health care providers. The tech-
niques necessary to pricing these two types of risk are radically different (as Section 2 
explained). The problem with both FFS and capitation is that in addition to distorting 
risk, neither has anything to do with clinical reality. That being the case, any effort to 
harness FFS or capitation to quality outcomes analysis is like trying to square the circle; 
it is a forced fit requiring ambiguous proxies that disassociate actual patient experience 
from the natural flow of care.
Second, it’s impossible to price technical risk through a probability mechanism like 
insurance. There are no modern instances of discrete goods and service being sold in 
other markets through insurance products. The attempt to integrate probability risk with 
technical risk sets up an unsolvable transfer pricing problem that shows capitation to be 
an inherently inefficient solution.xxvi As Jerry Solon, the inventor of the episode of care 
concept wrote in 1967:
The summary statistical data used to describe the medical care received by 
a population usually take the form of (1) stating how many in the popula-
tion have obtained medical services in a given period of time (the volume of 
users), and/or (2) expressing the volume of services in terms of the number 
of physician visits made, the days of inpatient care provided, the number of 
x-rays, lab tests, medications, physical therapy treatments, and so on. These 
culminations are valuable in so far as they represent, in an overall way, the 
sheer volume of service. But their very simplicity, their objectivity, and appar-
ent precision are deceptively reassuring. They create the illusion that that the 
essential facts of utilization are thus expressed. There is much more to tell of 
medical care that these superficial counts reveal. [Emphasis added]xxvii 
Hopefully, most readers will recognize that the coarse statistical indices Solon criticized 
are precisely the indices upon which capitation rates are calculated. And just as these 
crude roll-ups give the illusion of understanding care utilization, basing payment on 
them gives the illusion that care is being managed. Rather than shedding light on care 
management, capitation only made the delivery system more opaque. And this was true 
from both sides of the aisle. Health plans could not see through the capitated entity, and 
providers could not accurately adjust utilization patterns to fit the cap rate. 
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Third, the business logic of health insurance is categorically different from the business 
logic of health care. The conflicting incentives mean that one must eventually predominate 
over the other. As the experiences of Humana, FHP, Sutter Health Systems, and Harvard 
Pilgrim Health Care in the 1990’s demonstrated, a capitated house is a house divided.
As for primary care specifically, verification of this problem came to light during the sum-
mer of 1997 when Alta Bates Medical Group, in Emeryville, Calif., announced it would 
replace capitation with discounted FFS for its primary care providers.xxviii Alta Bates 
made the move because the proportional payments made to its PCPs under capitation 
did not accurately equate with the actual workload of productive individuals, and with-
out differential rewards, it was extremely difficult to motivate productive activity toward 
certain quality benchmarks.xxix Moreover, the motivation to excel and innovate tends to 
get lost under such an arrangement. Because capitation is such an extraordinarily crude 
payment mechanism—determined not as a function of productive activities but as an 
actuarial artifact—revenue cannot be synergistically linked to processes of care. This is 
especially noteworthy because Alta Bates constructed itself in the early 1990’s to thrive 
under what was then considered to be the inevitability of capitation and was absolutely 
couched in the arguments similar to the ones we hear today advocating Medical Homes; 
namely, that by capitalizing the payment of primary care through capitation to induce 
proactive care management, patients would be prevented from going better to worse, 
and kept away from expensive specialists and even more expensive hospital care. But 
it blew up before any gains could be shown, and this experience was repeated around 
the nation. By 2001, articles were announcing the end of capitated managed care and 
the return to FSS.xxx Why did this happen?
It is the severance of the production function of care, best described by episodes, 
and the derivation of capitation from probability functions that makes it nearly 
impossible to tell from the point of view of the bottom line whether a loss is due to 
an unanticipated actuarial blip or poor care productivity. Here is an example from a 
then popular trade journal specializing in capitation issues and dedicated to its success, 
Capitation Management Report, in an article titled, “Fine Tune Your Strategies to Beat the 
Capitation Blues” in 1997:
So how does an organization stay the course when it’s having trouble staying 
afloat under capitation?  Organizations first need to determine if their costs are 
truly out of line and whether the short-fall is temporary—due to seasonality 
or unpredicted actuarial (i.e., probability) risk—or a more pervasive problem 
related to excessive administration or medical costs… Sometimes, the problem 
isn’t cost… The provider may have accepted a rate that was too low or en-
countered poor risk selection. That’s not something you can manage your way 
out of. [Emphasis added]xxxi
Certainly not. But instead of recognizing the economic contradictions of capitation, 
the article offered an utterly dumbfounding solution, so common to the times: “If the 
problem is adverse selection, the provider should monitor the experience of the popu-
lation and contrast the cost of care with age- and sex-adjusted normative data. Armed 
with these comparisons, the provider should meet with the health plan, acknowledge 
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it underestimated risk and cite the need to prevent turnover and maintain patient 
satisfaction as grounds to increase the cap.”  
Passing strange! After confirming our hypothesis that capitation occludes tangible 
general ledger information for the primary care firm, we are asked to believe that physi-
cians can capably do what even the best social scientists would probably shun; that is, 
“monitor the population,” and then, using age-sex adjusters the best statisticians in the 
health services research business have concluded are practically uselessxxxii, perform an 
effective general ledger analysis. “Armed with these comparisons,” the poor doctor is 
supposed to convince health plan executives to raise the capitation rate, not using the 
analysis per se, but by arguing that patient satisfaction and turnover may go south. Such 
non-sequiturs were the norm for the day. 
In addition to the dark matter of trying to cull accurate cost and productivity data 
through the viscous medium of probability space, capitation tends to fragment intensive 
episodes of care requiring multiple providers, which brings us to our fourth reason why 
pricing probability risk is so different from pricing technical risk. Except in the case of 
global capitation for Integrated Delivery Systems (which, even in the heyday of capita-
tion, was very rare, never rising above 6 percent of all IDS revenue)xxxiii, capitating pro-
vider components separately such as PCPs, specialists, and hospitals was extremely dif-
ficult, and left the coordination of unintegrated episodes up in the air. Shared risk pools 
were often argued as the means for pulling coordination together and unifying interests, 
but it never worked out, and shared risk pools were dropped almost as quickly as they 
appeared. Without the agency of one managerial entity at technical risk for efficiently 
integrating the entire production function of an episode of care, the unified administra-
tive machinery necessary to tightly align clinically homogenous care processes did not 
exist—by and large, they still do not. If we resurrect capitation for Medical Homes, lack 
of financial coordination across clinically homogenous care continua will abide. The 
following explains why this is so.
Imagine all of health care being divided into three concentric circles. The first is primary 
care, from which, most other care activities radiate. The second is specialist/tertiary 
care, and the third is facility/hospital and quaternary care. The totality of the circles is 
comprised of the total U.S. health care spend, which surpassed $2 trillion in 2006xxxiv, 
and is dominated by FFS payment. This FFS world can be bisected by slices of care, pro-
portional to the overall spend, which are comprised of all various disease states and in-
juries. Each of these slices is the full longitudinal pathway any given episode of care can 
take. In this case, we’ll consider Diabetes Mellitus, an expensive disease and its possible 
comorbid conditions that gobbles up about 10 percent of the total medical spend (es-
timated at $174 billion in 2007 by the American Diabetes Association).xxxv As a pro-
portional slice of the overall spend, its area is much larger than, say, Cystic Fibrosis or 
Tay-Sachs, but not much more than Congestive Heart Failure. 
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The figure above gives us a bird’s-eye view of episodes of care relative to one another in 
terms of the absolute medical spend. But if we flip the chart on its side, we can examine 
the distribution of dollars within any given episode and their relative rates of expenditure 
as determined by primary care, specialty care and institutional care boundaries. Now, it 
should be intuitively obvious that not all diabetics are contained within the boundary of 
primary care; in fact, as the PROMTHEUS ECR data analysis in Section 2 reveals, a great 
many patients are radiating out of primary care and into the far more expensive domains 
of specialty and facility care. This is exemplified by the relative altitudes of the three 
segments where, for instance, the costs associated with institutional care for diabetics 
far exceed the costs of primary care. As a result of RBRVS distortions, dollars have been 
pulled away from primary care into the more care-intensive domains, but exacerbating 
the problem even more is the fact that only 54.9 percent of patients receive recommended 
carexxxvi, and care coordination between all domains is so poor.xxxvii Thus, the dollar 
altitudes of specialty care and facility care are much higher than primary care.
The guiding assumption informing the move to create Medical Homes—one which 
we accept—is that by reconstituting primary care through payment reform, primary 
care providers can invest in Electronic Health Records, care practice reengineering, and 
more effective care coordination with allied providers. By raising the dollar altitude of 
primary care, it is hoped that we can lower the altitudes of specialty and facility care, 
and not just because it’s “cheaper” care, but because it represents patient populations 
who are healthier because their care is being better managed. We enlarge this argument 
Fee-for-Service World
Diabetes Episodes of Care
Episode Point of Origin
Primary Care
Specialty Care
Insitutional Care
Total Dollar Continuity Over the Longitudinal Path of Care
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by stating that merely ramping up primary care dollars to achieve this will never be 
accepted by plans and payers; additional dollars will only be released when tied to 
proven care improvement, and that resurrecting capitation is not the optimal means for 
do so. Again, this requires further elaboration.
Along with the other arguments we have marshaled, primary care capitation leaves the 
full episode of care financially fragmented. Observe the bird’s-eye figure once again. 
If a Medical Home is fully capitated, the financial incentive boundary ends at primary 
care, yet a good deal of the diabetic patients are still flowing into the other domains. 
Even if primary care for diabetics is greatly improved, there will still be many instances 
of patients requiring some form of specialty or facility care. By capitating the Medical 
Home, an artificial financial boundary—determined not by episode of care, but by 
coarse statistical abstracts drawn over the entire panel of patients—terminates the full 
pathway of clinically homogenous care at the primary care giver’s doorway. The only 
way to tie financial incentives to the other care domains is to resurrect the risk pool 
proxies we observed in the 1990’s or to tie bonuses to PCPs through reduced overall 
rates of inpatient admissions. But these are exactly the kind of crude indices that Jerry 
Solon and other health services researchers criticized so long ago, and proved unwork-
able in the 1990’s. It makes little sense, therefore, to advance progress towards Medical 
Homes through retrogressive ideas.
By far, it is better to model the reimbursement dollars around the patient and his or her 
potential care pathway, than to force fit dollars around predetermined structural solu-
tions and crude heterogeneous populations.xxxviii No matter how much “risk-adjustment” 
is fixed to population-based payments, it’s still governed by probability risk, and places 
Primary Care
Specialty Care
Institutional Care
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physicians in the business of insurance, a business they are poorly suited to manage 
and to which their normative fiduciary roles come into profound conflict. As Krane and 
Emery have written on this subject:
Probability risk is the risk assumed by one entity (the insurer) when it agrees,  
in exchange for payment (premium), to do something of value for another 
(the insured) upon the happening of a contingent, future event. Premiums  
for similar risks are pooled, and the premium charged is calculated to be  
sufficient to fund the performance obligation from the pooled premium. 
Therefore, probability risk is the risk that total premiums collected will be 
adequate to fund the total performance obligation due upon the occurrence of 
contingent, future events. Capitation is an example of probability or insurance 
risk because a healthcare provider (insurer) agrees, in exchange for a fixed, 
per member per month payment (premium), to assume the risk of providing 
potentially unlimited amounts of defined health benefits (something of value) 
to the HMO (insured) upon the happening of sickness or injury (a contingent, 
future event).xxxix 
By this we observe that capitation is really a fee-for-indemnity concept that, ironically, 
puts providers in the very business the health plan is ostensibly in business for.xl Not 
only does it bring fiduciary roles into conflict, but it also makes patients—not medical 
services—the tradable commodity.xli In exchange for a certain amount of patients for a 
fixed price, providers agree to indemnify the plan’s assets (e.g., premium reserves) from 
actuarial payout volatility. But the greatest conflict is yet to come.
The fifth reason that designing provider reimbursement around probability risk is so 
different from designing reimbursement around technical risk is that delegating risk 
through episodes of care preserves patient choice (more on this later). There is simply 
no way to capitate an open panel or a broad network of health care providers. The sine 
quo non of capitation is provider exclusivity. Of all the problems capitated managed care 
encountered, none even remotely exceeded the frenzy of consumer backlash that arose 
from restricting patient choice at the point of service. As Richard Wessland, Managing 
Director of BCD Advisors, noted in an interview in July, 1997: “We have a consumer and 
purchaser backlash regarding accountability, value, access to care, freedom of choice, 
and other elements,” all of which he attributed to capitated systems.xlii In the same inter-
view, Wessland correctly predicted that pay-for-performance programs would displace 
capitation. By 1997, the writing was on the wall, as J. Daniel Beckham explained the 
problem in the Healthcare Forum Journal:
[H]undreds of healthcare organizations and thousands of physicians invested 
heavily, intellectually and financially, in the capitation/channeling presump-
tion only to feel the earth shift under their feet as choice made its power felt. 
Too invested now to undertake the costs of switching to a new model, they are 
poised to have their ships wrecked on the rocks of market reality.xliii
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Beckham turned out to be right. The market reality of consumers demanding choice 
at the point of service proved too powerful for capitated systems. Ultimately, it was the 
market violence of consumer choice that blew capitated managed care to pieces. As 
some of us predicted well before this all became glaringly apparent, Americans will not 
tolerate paternalistic health plans and systems telling them where to go for care and what 
to do with their physicians. Period. The will for choice produced what Jeff Goldsmith 
once called “selective disintegration” at a time when managed care theory predicted the 
triumph of large integrated systems operating under capitation.xliv They literally began to 
fall apart. In the dreary year of 1997 for capitated managed care, Goldsmith observed:
Many nationally prominent integrated systems are performing terribly along every  
dimension of performance that you can think of—earnings, customer satisfaction,  
productivity, morale… Their theories about what would happen once they 
reached a certain mass or scale are not proving valid.xlv
Despite the fact that PPOs were once believed to be merely transitional products 
ferrying consumers from traditional indemnity plans to HMO nirvana, by the end of 
the 1990’s, PPO growth had far outstripped HMO growth, by a factor of about 2 to 1. 
The reason is simple. For all the toxicities that FFS introduces into the health care 
delivery system, it has one strength that gives it a triumphant market advantage over 
capitation: it accommodates patient choice at the point of service. For this reason, 
discounted FFS dominates provider reimbursement to this day, accounting for well over 
90 percent of all health care receipts. Even at the zenith of capitation’s popularity in the 
1990’s, an AMA commissioned study showed that only 23 percent of physicians with 
HMO contracts reported having at least one capitated contract (5 percent for physicians 
contracting with preferred provider organizations);xlvi overall, capitation never exceeded 
9 percent of physician reimbursement and 10 percent of hospital reimbursement.xlvii 
Given this truth, it is difficult to fathom why anyone would advocate a payment mecha-
nism as inherently limited in its ability to capture marketshare as capitation—especially 
if it is to power up Medical Homes across the nation. We have every reason to believe 
patients, plans and providers will reject this arrangement. 
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technical aPPendiX B 
Chronic Care ECRs
Amita Rastogi, M.D., M.H.A.
METhodS:
For each ECR, three basic process steps were followed:  
Step 1 involved creating the claims code definitions and triggers for each episode, 
time window for the episode, eligibility and exclusion criteria. Decisions were made 
about which codes to include as part of typical care and services, which services 
to consider as related to potentially avoidable complications instead of a normal 
progression of the condition, and what to consider as an irrelevant service to be 
excluded from the episode. 
Step 2 involved using statistical modeling to identify factors that directly impact the 
quantity of services within a given ECR from those that can be attributed to patient 
variables (e.g., comorbidities) and the relative strength of each variable. The result is 
a severity-adjusted formula for the base price for typical care.
Step 3 involved the quantification of the allowance for potentially avoidable complica-
tions and the full construction of the ECR (excluding the regional adjustment) into a 
global price for an episode of medical care. 
The methodology is available as open source and can be adopted by plans and providers 
to create their own case rates based on their own data and fee schedules.xlviii
Data Sources
We analyzed 2005-2006 claims data from a commercially insured population (CIP) 
of over 4.6 million members. The database contained inpatient and outpatient facility, 
inpatient and outpatient professional; laboratory; radiology; ancillary; and pharmacy 
claims. Diagnoses and procedures were coded using the International Classification of 
Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes, and the American 
Medical Association’s Current Procedural Terminology (CPT®) codes. National Drug 
Codes (NDC) were used for pharmacy claims. Results of laboratory or radiology tests 
were not available. We used the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)’s 
Clinical Classification Software (CCS) as a means of grouping ICD-9-CM diagnosis and 
procedure codes, and the CCS for CPTs classification to group CPT codes into meaningful, 
clinically homogenous categories for further analysis. To estimate ECR price, we created 
a cost field called “allowed amount” that represented the reimbursable amount and was 
a sum of the paid amount plus the patient portion of the payment in the form of co-pay, 
deductibles and coinsurance amounts, as reported in the CIP database. Throughout this 
paper, cost refers to the “allowed amount” field.
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Evidence-Informed Case Rates
Using the commercial database, we constructed Evidence-informed Case Rates (ECRs), 
which are condition-specific formulas for calculating a risk-adjusted global price to be 
used as a basis for paying providers.xlix Payments cover the cost of care recommended 
by well-accepted clinical guidelines or expert opinion, adjusted for type and intensity 
of services due to patient severity and comorbid factors (“typical” care). The formulas 
estimate the cost for an entire episode of care for a given condition treated for a defined 
period of time. In addition, an allowance is created for each episode, for 1) underuse 
adjustment/care coordination to account for minimum essential services required for 
each condition based on clinical guidelines, and 2) an additional allowance is created 
for payment for potentially avoidable complications, and is made available as part of the 
ECR price, irrespective of the fact that complications occur, but based on the severity 
of the episode. We created complete ECRs for six chronic medical conditions: conges-
tive heart failure (CHF), coronary artery disease (CAD), diabetes, hypertension, chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and asthma. 
Episode Construction
The first step in ECR development was to construct an episode of care. Condition-specif-
ic trigger codes start an episode, and a predefined period determines the duration of the 
episode. For chronic medical conditions, this time period was one year from the trigger 
claim. Using CHF as an example, Table 1 displays condition-specific definitions (e.g., 
triggers, time period, exclusions). Similar criteria were defined for all the six chronic 
medical conditions. All claims for a member, including pharmacy claims, were identified 
using a unique member identifier, and aggregated together to create the complete set of 
services within the episode. The total costs for the entire episode were then calculated 
for each member. 
Patients who did not meet the eligibility criteria, were not continuously enrolled for the 
entire episode duration, were missing gender, or had out of range or missing episode 
costs were excluded. Claims with medical diagnosis or procedural codes for services 
not directly related to care for the index condition were excluded, as were claims for 
“case-breaker” services, that is, major procedures which suggest that the index condition 
has advanced to a degree that services are now being provided for a different condition 
(e.g., coronary artery bypass graft in an episode of CHF or CAD). Pharmacy claims with 
NDC codes not relevant to the episode were also removed. The remaining claims were 
considered “relevant services”—this included claims related to (a) typical care or (b) 
potentially avoidable complications (PAC) for the index condition. 
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For each of the chronic medical conditions, claims were considered PAC claims if they 
were classified as, or associated with, an inpatient stay or an emergency room visit 
(except for CAD); carried a PAC code in any of the four diagnosis fields for all other 
claims (Table 1); or had a procedure code that was related to services provided for a 
complication. The remaining claims were considered typical claims. For CAD, some of 
the hospital stays and emergency room visits were considered as typical services since 
services for chest pain are part of management of CAD and could be in the emergency 
room or hospital setting. Using typical professional, outpatient facility, inpatient facility 
(in case of CAD) and pharmacy claims, we created risk-adjustment models for each of 
the six chronic medical conditions. Episodes with <$10 for remaining total typical costs 
were excluded from further modeling for the typical ECR. For each patient, we selected 
the first episode that met the eligibility criteria; therefore, each episode represented a 
unique person. Figure 1 details the data flow using CHF as an example.
Definition
Type of model(s) developed Outpatient professional risk-adjustment model 
Condition Trigger Codes* The patient has a professional claim with one of these ICD-9-CM  
diagnosis codes in any position:
428
428.y, y=0,1,9
428.yz, y=2,3,4, z=0,2 or blank
402.y1, y=0,1,9
404.yz, y=0,1,9 z=1,3
398.91
Episode Period One year starting from the date of service of the first trigger claim
Continuous enrollment requirement 9 months
Patient Exclusions 1.  Remove episode if allowed amount (CHF and all other costs combined) are  
missing, < $20, or > $1,000,000.
2. Remove stay claim if stay claim costs are missing or < $50.
Medical exclusions Exclude patients with HIV, suicide, pregnancy and newborn conditions
Procedural exclusions Exclude claims with any major or irrelevant surgical procedure
Case Breaker Services* Exclude claims with any major but relevant surgical procedure
Potentially Avoidable Complications 
(PACs)
Syncope, coma, hypotension, dizziness, stroke, CVA, septicemia, meningi-
tis, adverse effect of drugs, overdose, complications of medical care, acute 
myocardial infarction, acute renal failure, urinary tract infections, pneumonia, 
lung complications, lung abscess, empyema, bronchiectasis, respiratory failure, 
tracheostomy, mechanical ventilation, decubitus ulcer, gangrene, phlebitis, deep 
vein thrombosis, pulmonary embolism, skin and woumd care, gastritis, stomach 
ulcers, gastrointestinal hemorrhage.
Additionally, all hospitalizations and all emergency room visits are considered as 
PACs as well as professional services related to these hospitalizations. 
*  Case-breaker services refer to services that indicate the patient’s condition has advanced to such a degree that the services are now for a different condition  
(i.e. other than CHF).
Table 1. Condition-Specific Definitions for Episode Construction (Congestive Heart Failure)
35
SUSTAInIng ThE MEdICAl hoME: how PRoMEThEUS PAYMEnT® CAn REVITAlIzE PRIMARY CARE
Figure 1. Flow Diagram
Unique Members N=4.7 M 
Total Claims Cost $95.2 B
CHF Trigger  
n= 103,322 Members
Continuous Enrollment + Reasonable Costs 
Members n= 54,998  
Total Medical Cost $5,778 M
RELEVANT 
Members n= 48,878
• Total Cost $1,333 M 
• Medical Cost $1,096 M 
   Stay Cost $810 M 
   Professional & Ancillary $286 M 
• Pharmacy Cost $237 M
TYPICAL 
Members n=46,721*
• Total Cost $410 M 
• Professional Cost $200 M 
• Pharmacy Cost $210 M
PAC 
Members n=33,140*
• Total Cost $923 M 
• Medical Cost $897 M 
     – Stay $810 M 
     – Professional $86 M 
• Pharmacy Cost $27 M
Excluded  
(n= 6,120 Members; $4,683 M Medical Costs)
• Medical Exclusion (e.g. HIV): n= 469; $66 M 
• No CHF-Related Services: n= 3,998; $4,265 M 
• Major Procedures: n= 391; $285 M 
• Acute CHF Trigger: n= 1,262; $66 M
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Creating Severity-Adjustment Models
We used multiple linear regression modeling to identify factors that influence total 
costs—the dependent variable – for each chronic medical ECR. Since the distribution of 
total costs was right-skewed, we transformed it using natural logarithms to satisfy regres-
sion model assumptions. For the diabetes ECR, the log transformation was not strong 
enough to meet the constant error variance assumption, so the Box-Cox transformation 
was applied (formula: (y0.25 - 1)/0.25).1 The independent variables considered consisted 
of demographics (age, gender), severity of index condition, comorbidities, pharmacy 
and procedure variables. To avoid overfitting (i.e., developing a model that predicts costs 
well using the analysis data, but does not have good predictive ability on new data), we 
validated the models. For diabetes and CHF, split-sampling methods were used.3, li The 
episodes in the analysis sample were randomly assigned to one of three datasets: model 
building (MB; 50 percent of episodes), validation (approximately 25 percent), and test 
(approximately 25 percent). The final models were based on the MB sample. Subsequent 
ECR model validation was performed using bootstrap techniques (see section below). 
The methodology used to create the diabetes and CHF typical models is as follows. 
To select predictors for initial models, we conducted t-tests (or analysis of variance for 
age group) to measure the association between each independent variable and costs 
(univariate analysis). To improve the power to detect associations, we chose variables 
with at least 30 episodes per category and a univariate test p-value less than 0.25 to be 
candidate predictors for models. This p-value was chosen instead of 0.05 to increase our 
chances of detecting important variables.lii Variables with high clinical relevance were 
initially forced into the model (e.g., for diabetes: type I or II, controlled or uncontrolled 
diabetes). Multiple linear regression with the stepwise variable selection procedure was 
used to select predictors of costs among the candidate variables. The p-value to enter and 
exit the model was set at 0.20 to improve our ability to identify important predictors.liii
The stepwise model was reviewed and modified by the clinical expert, and subsequent 
models were fit without the stepwise procedure. The final predictors retained in the 
model were those with at least 30 episodes per category, a positive coefficient (since 
during the PROMETHEUS implementation, variables with negative coefficients would 
require a negative payment), a low variance inflation factor (VIF<3) to avoid collinearity, 
a high partial R-square to make the model parsimonious, performed consistently across 
the MB, validation and test samples, and those that were clinically plausible.  
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In October, 2008, we changed our statistical methodology so that the methodology would 
be easy for a wide variety of organizations to apply. This methodology was used for the 
COPD, asthma, hypertension and CAD typical models. We created a predictive model 
satisfying ordinary least-square (OLS) assumptions, using a natural log transformation 
of the dependent variable “cost.” We performed all analyses on the full dataset, after 
trimming outliers (below the 1st percentile and above the 99th percentile). We used 
similar univariate techniques as described above for screening variables to be kept into 
the model. Age and age-squared were fed into the models if the relationship of age 
to costs was quadratic. Multiple linear regression with the stepwise variable selection 
procedure was used to select predictors of costs among the candidate variables. The 
p-value to enter and exit the model was set at 0.25. Variables occurring in less than 
1 percent of the patients, those having a p-value greater than 0.25, those with high 
variance inflation factors (VIF > 3.0), and those with negative coefficients (except for age 
and gender) were eliminated.   
The model was then validated using bootstrap techniques. The model was run using 
stepwise selection with SLE=.05 and SLS=.05 on 200 bootstrap samples, and a record 
was kept of how many times each variable was selected in the 200 model runs. A boot-
strap sample was created by sampling with replacement, from the full dataset until a 
sample of the same size as the full dataset was drawn. Any variables that were forced 
into the model above were also forced in the 200 bootstrap models. Any variable that 
entered into less than 170 bootstrap models (85 percent of the models) was dropped. 
The initial model was modified based on the results of the validation techniques, and 
unstable variables were dropped. The final model was recalibrated on the full dataset.
             
Creating Illustrative Examples
To create illustrative examples, the final model was used to estimate the total “typical” 
severity-adjusted ECR price for hypothetical patients. The intercept from the model, 
plus an adjustment for age and gender (if included in the model), was used to calculate 
the base price, also called as the “actual” minimum (intercept) cost of care. For CHF, 
the base price was $1,488 for a hypothetical patient between 50 and 64 years of age 
with no comorbid conditions, no procedural services and no pharmacy costs. Patients 
with additional predictor variables / risk factors had additional costs determined by the 
respective regression coefficient from the model. All calculations for costs were performed 
on the transformed scale (CHF, CAD, hypertension, COPD and asthma: natural log; 
Diabetes: Box-Cox) and then the results were back-transformed to the original scale 
(dollars). Table 2 shows the final CHF model with the natural logarithmic coefficients 
and examples of three hypothetical patients and their ECR price for typical CHF care. 
Similar models were constructed for each of the six chronic medical conditions.
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Predictor1
Number of  
Episodes with 
Variable
Percent 
Episodes 
(N=45,787)
Coefficient on 
Ln Scale2 Patient 1 Patient 2 Patient 3
Intercept 45,787 100.0% 7.3049 1 1 1
Age: < 50  vs. 50-64 782 1.7% -0.0687 0 0 0
Age: 65-79 vs. 50-64 15,813 34.5% 0.1330 0 0 0
Age: >= 80 vs. 50-64 23,411 51.1% -0.0059 0 0 0
Heart valve disorders 4,506 9.8% 0.1463 0 1 1
Coronary atherosclerosis and  
other heart disease 19,652 42.9% 0.2072 0 1 1
Carditis, Cardiomyopathy 4,058 8.9% 0.1294 0 1 1
Conduction disorders 3,723 8.1% 0.2003 0 1 1
Eye, ENT, oral procedures 615 1.3% 0.4293 0 1 1
Diagnostic cardiac catheterization, 
coronary arteriography
882 1.9% 0.4524 0 1 1
DME, visual and hearing aids 9,104 19.9% 0.4552 0 0 0
Cardiac ablation, pacemaker or 
cardioverter/defibrillator
680 1.5% 0.6575 0 0 0
Statins and other anti-lipid agents 6,581 14.4% 0.2161 0 1 1
Bronchodilators and other  
antiasthmatics
15,574 34.0% 0.2345 0 0 1
Antiarrhythmic agents 6,100 13.3% 0.2274 0 0 1
Inhalers and respiratory agents 7,376 16.1% 0.2061 0 1 1
Antacids and drugs for other oral 
and GI problems
27,060 59.1% 0.2915 0 1 1
Diuretics 36,548 79.8% 0.2469 0 1 1
Other cardiovascular agents 13,975 30.5% 0.1697 0 0 1
Beta-Blockers 31,234 68.2% 0.2322 0 0 1
ACEI, ARB, anti-renin drugs 29,454 64.3% 0.1672 0 1 1
Calcium channel blocking agents 16,172 35.3% 0.1672 0 0 1
Antiplatelet agents, thrombin 
inhibitors
11,699 25.6% 0.2214 0 1 1
Antidepressants 16,569 36.2% 0.1940 0 0 1
Severity-adjusted Price of ECR3    $1,488 $27,418 $93,341
1 Predictors of episode costs from a multiple linear regression model. Professional, outpatient facility and pharmacy costs were modeled on the natural log scale. The models included patient 
demographic, medical comorbid conditions, procedures performed, and pharmacy use. 
2 All coefficients were significantly different from 0 at the 0.05 level. The adjusted R-square was 41.9%
3 To calculate the severity-adjusted price of the ECR by model, sum the estimates for the intercept and desired predictors (sumP) and compute e(sumP). 
Table 2. Construction of Severity-Adjusted Evidence-informed Case Rate (ECR) for Typical 
Care for Congestive Heart Failure (CHF) for Three Hypothetical Patients
Hypothetical Patient Scenarios
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Pricing the Evidence-Based Services 
A foundational element of PROMETHEUS is that the base set of services should include 
all the services that are recommended by Clinical Practice Guidelines or expert opinion 
as laid out by the Clinical Working Groupsliv or published guidelines in the literature. 
Table 3 outlines the minimum evidence-based core services for each of the chronic 
medical conditions priced using our developmental database. For CHF, the evidence-
informed core services priced at $3,597. 
Table 3. Evidence-informed Core Services and Prices
CIP  
Database
CHF CAD Diabetes Hypertension COPD Asthma
Evidence-Based 
Services
Unit price N Price N Price N Price N Price N Price N Price
Physicians              
PCP-new $178 1 $178 1 $178 0 $0 0 $0 1 $178 0 $0
PCP-established $104 5 $519 3 $312 4 $416 4 $416 2 $208 4 $416
Cardiology/  
Pulmonologist $242 3 $726 1 $234
0 $0 1 $121 1 $242 0 $0
Endocrinologist $242 0 $0 0 $0 0.1 $24 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0
Ophthalmologist $242 0 $0 0 $0 1 $242 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0
Ancillary              
Diabetes Educator $104 0 $0 0 $0 1 $104 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0
Cardiac Rehab $35 12 $422 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0
Emergency Room $469 0 $0 0 $0 0.1 $47 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0
Diagnostics / Lab              
Echo transthoracic $458 2 $917 1 $458 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0
Electrocardiogram $58 2 $116 1 $58 0 $0 1 $58 0 $0 0 $0
Chest x-ray $90 2 $180 1 $90 0 $0 0 $0 1 $90 1 $90
Lung function test $35 2 $70 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 4 $141 1 $35
metabolic panel $30 6 $177 1 $30 0 $0 1 $30 0 $0 1 $30
Lipid panel $70 2 $139 1 $70 2 $139 1 $70 0 $0 0 $0
Liver Function Tests $60 2 $121 1 $60 1 $60 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0
Microalbumin, 
quantitative $16 2 $32 1 $16
0 $0 1 $16 0 $0 0 $0
HbA1c $51 0 $0 0 $0 3 $154 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0
Potassium $37 0 $0 0 $0 1 $19 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0
Creatinine $75 0 $0 0 $0 2 $113 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0
Est. Evidence- 
Based Costs   $3,597  $1,505
 $1,317  $710  $858  $570
1 All specialists are computed at the same rate: cardiologist, pulmonologist, endocrinology, ophthalmologist.
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Determining the Underuse and Care-Coordination Allowance
If price of an individual episode fell below the minimum evidence-based costs, we 
classified it as underuse, and within PROMETHEUS, we provide an underuse and care-
coordination allowance to these episodes. The allowance for care-coordination was 
calculated as the difference between the evidence-based recommended care and the 
actual minimum (intercept) costs of care from the regression models described above. The 
underuse amount represents the difference between what should have been the minimum 
costs based on care following evidence-informed guidelines, and what the patients in the 
database actually received for the core services provided. For CHF, the care coordination 
amount was calculated as $2,112 as the difference between evidence-informed cost of 
minimum core services ($3,597) and the actual minimum (intercept) costs ($1,488). 
Potentially Avoidable Complications and the PAC Pool
Claims and services that were aggregated as potentially avoidable complications (PACs) 
were used to create the PAC pool. The PAC pool helped quantify the waste within the 
system and identify specifically where the potential for savings lies. The total amount of 
dollars in the PAC pool formed the basis of determining the PAC allowance that in turn 
is paid to providers irrespective of the occurrence of PACs, and serves as a warranty for 
care defects. The details of the PAC analysis and the distribution of costs were used to 
identify which complications were major cost drivers, and to make the data actionable 
for providers to focus their energies on. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the most 
expensive PACs within an episode of CHF. Similar PAC analyses were conducted to 
identify the top cost drivers of PACs for each chronic medical condition studied.
Figure 2. Distribution of Most Expensive Potentially Avoidable Complications (PACs)  
in Congestive Heath Failure as a Percentage of Total PAC Costs
!
Index Condition Flare-up
Respiratory Failure
Cardiac Dysrhythmias / 
Conduction Disorders
Pneumonia, Lung Complications
Adverse Effects of Drugs, 
Overdose, Poisoning
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PAC Allowance
The total dollars associated with the treatment of PACs helped determine the PAC 
allowance that is given to providers towards payment for PACs irrespective of their 
occurrence, and is in part proportional to the severity and comorbidity factors present 
in the patients cared for within the ECR. By convention, PROMETHEUS reduces the 
total PAC allowance by the amount used to rebase the ECR for care coordination, and 
allocates 50 percent of the remaining PAC pool across each patient. A portion of this 
pool (25 percent) is given as a fixed amount to each episode, and the balance (75 
percent) is allocated as a proportion of the risk-adjusted, rebased price for each patient. 
This is discussed in detail in another paper.lv Similar PAC allowances were developed 
for all the six chronic medical conditions. 
Construction of the Complete ECR
Table 4 illustrates development of the complete ECR using CHF as an example. A 
complete ECR is derived as the sum of the typical evidence informed case rate using the 
severity adjusted regression models plus the underuse/care-coordination allowance plus 
the PAC allowance for each patient. As the example shows, for patient 1, the severity 
adjusted price for typical care is $1,488. This is adjusted for underuse/care coordination 
by $2,112 and by the PAC allowance of $3,165 to give a complete ECR price of $6,765. 
Similarly, hypothetical patient 2 has a “typical” ECR price of $27,418 based on the severity 
adjustment models for typical care and after the underuse/care coordination and PAC 
allowance adjustments, the complete ECR price is $51,308.  
Table 4. Distribution of most Expensive Potentially Avoidable Complications (PACs)  
in Congestive Heath Failure as a Percentage of Total PAC Costs
PAC Allowance  
Calculations
Factors Average Cost
Number of  
Episodes
Total Cost
Total relevant CHF episodes  $27,267 48,878 $1,332,774,251
Typical CHF episodes  $8,765 46,721 $409,503,974
PAC CHF episodes  $27,860 33,140 $923,270,276
Added Burden for PACs  $27,860  $923,270,276
Evidence-informed Adjustment 
(Adjustment for Underusea)  $2,112 48,878 $103,248,387
Allowable Cost of PACs 50%  $410,010,945
Flat Fee Portion (spread 25% of 
PAC costs over all episodes) 25% $2,097  $102,502,736
Proportional Rate (75% of PAC 
costs as a rate over base costs) 75%   72%
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ECR Construction
Hypothetical Patients
Factors Patient 1 Patient 2 Patient 3
Severity-adjusted Base Price of 
ECR for typical CHF patientsb  $27,267 48,878 $1,332,774,251
Allowance for Underuse  
and Care Coordination  
($3,597 - $1,488)
$2,112 $8,765 46,721 $409,503,974
Allowance for PACs  $27,860 33,140 $923,270,276
Flat Fee Allowance $2,097 $27,860  $923,270,276
Proportional Allowance 72% $2,112 48,878 $103,248,387
Total ECR per Patient (severity-
adjusted + Underuse/Care 
Coordination + PAC Allowance)
50%  $410,010,945
a The adjustment for underuse/care coordination ($2,112) is the difference between (i) the evidence-informed core  services price (table 3) and (ii) the intercept cost of the 
severity-adjusted base price for a patient with none of the comorbidites, procedures, etc. in the severity-adjusted regression model ( Hypothetical patient 1 in table 2).
xlviii For a complete description of the PROMETHEUS Payment methodology, the codesets for each episode, the results of the modeling effort to date, and access 
to the SAS programs that help develop Evidence-informed Case Rates, see  www.PROMETHEUSpayment.org/playbook/index.htm, accessed January 2009.
xlix F. de Brantes and A. Rastogi, “Evidence-Informed Case Rates: Paying for Safer, More Reliable Care,” The Commonwealth Fund 40, publ. 1146 (2008): 1-14.
xlx Neter J, Wasserman W, and Kutner MH. Applied Linear Statistical Models, 3rd ed. Homewood, IL: IRWIN, 1990.
l Iezzoni LI, ed. Risk Adjustment for Measuring Health Care Outcomes, 3rd ed. Chicago, IL: Health Administration Press, 2003.
li Bendel RB and Afifi AA. “Comparison of stopping rules in forward regression”, JASA no. 72 (1977): 46-53.
lii Bendel RB, ibid
liii For Clinical Working Group Guidelines, see Guidelines for each chronic medical condition, www.PROMETHEUSpayment.org/playbook/index.htm, accessed 
January 2009.
liv de Brantes et al, “Creating Warranties in an Episode of Care Payment System”, under review.
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technical aPPendiX c 
Chronic Care ECR Estimator
Guy D’Andrea, M.B.A.
PROMETHEUS Payment is designed to be a “win-win-win” for patients, physicians and 
health care purchasers. Patients benefit by avoiding PACs and achieving better health 
outcomes, and purchasers from lower health costs. Physicians who help patients stay 
healthy should benefit by retaining the portion of the episode case rate that normally 
would go to pay for the cost of avoidable PACs. To test the proposition that physicians 
will benefit under this new payment system, PROMETHEUS (with support from Discern 
Consulting) built a simulation of a primary care physician practice called the Chronic 
Care ECR Estimator.
The ECR Estimator is an Excel-based model used to simulate a population of chroni-
cally ill patients being treated in a primary care practice. Wherever possible, the data in 
the ECR Estimator are based on analysis of a large database for a commercially insured 
population. For example, the average fee-for-service (FFS) costs and the prevalence of 
chronic conditions and associated risk factors are all based on this database.
As a baseline, we assumed4 a total population of 2,000 patients in the practice, or which 500 
are chronically ill. Chronic conditions within this population are distributed as follows:
  • Hypertension – 310 patients (62%)
  • Coronary Artery Disease – 70 patients (14%)
  • Diabetes – 50 patients (10%)
  • Asthma – 35 Patients (7%)
  • Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease – 25 patients (5%)
  • Congestive Heart Failure – 10 patients (2%)
Next, using randomization functions in Excel, we modeled each of the individual chroni-
cally ill patients in the physician practice. Parameters for each patient included age, 
gender and whether certain risk factors were present. (The risk factors included are 
those that were found to have a significant impact on total costs based on the analysis 
of the commercial insurance database.) While each patient was randomly generated, the 
probabilities for each parameter followed the probabilities observed in the commercially 
insured population. For example, each chronic disease has a certain age distribution, 
and each risk factor has a certain probability associated with the patient’s age.
4 All of the assumptions in the Chronic Care ECR Estimator can be adjusted to: 1) test different parameters; 2) cover the details of a specific primary care practice or 
community; and/or 3) integrate new evidence as it becomes available.
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Here is an example of a diabetes patient from the model:
  • Age: 60
  • Gender: Female
  • Risk Factors Present
        Medical
 - Diabetes – IDDM, Uncontrolled
 - Thyroid Disorders
 - Ancillary, home health, transport
 - DME, visual, hearing aids
        Pharmacy
 - Insulin
 - Other anti-diabetics 
 - Other cardiovascular agents
 - Statins and other anti-lipid agents
This process is replicated for each of the 500 patients, thus generating a patient population 
that a typical primary care physician might treat. For each patient, the ECR estimator 
then completes two calculations: 1) what the patient’s costs would be under traditional 
FFS reimbursement and 2) the PROMETHEUS ECR payment for that patient. In general, 
the PROMETHEUS payment will be higher than the FFS reimbursement, because the 
PROMETHEUS payment includes allowances for care coordination and some PACs. 
The difference between the FFS and PROMETHEUS payment is the physician’s “bonus 
potential” for that patient. By summing the bonus potential across all patients, we can 
calculate the physicians’ total PROMETHEUS bonus potential for the population. In 
this example, running 1,000 iterations of the ECR Estimator, we find that the bonus 
potential is $541,339 with a standard deviation of $7,610 (the variation is due to random 
fluctuations in patients’ risk profiles).
Of course, the crucial word here is “potential.” In PROMETHEUS Payment, the physi-
cian is responsible for extra costs incurred when a patient experiences a PAC. If too 
many patients have PACs, the costs of treatment will exceed the extra payment, and the 
physician will lose money compared to FFS. It is therefore in the physician’s interest to 
expend some resources to reduce the potential occurrence of PACs. However, it is still 
likely that some patients will experience PACs, and these costs must also be deducted 
from the bonus potential. Aggregating these concepts allows us to develop a model 
for “net bonus.” Net bonus equals potential bonus minus PAC costs and minus dollars 
invested to reduce the PAC rate. For the ECR Estimator, we account for two types of in-
vestments to reduce PACs. Physicians may make a fixed-cost investment that impacts the 
care received by all patients (adding an electronic medical record system is an example 
of such an investment). Physicians may also make variable per patient investments, 
and the amounts of these investments may be different for each chronic condition. For 
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example, the physician might spend $1,000 per patient to reduce PACs in CHF patients, 
since PACs for these patients tend to be very expensive. The physician might spend less 
per hypertension patient, because related PACs cost relatively less. 
The physician’s goal will be to optimize the investment in reducing PACs. Invest too 
little, and the rate of PACs will not drop, and the physician may spend too much money 
treating those PACs. Invest too much, and much of the potential bonus will be eroded 
by the investment.
It is at this point that we leave the empirical aspects of the ECR Estimator and enter 
the theoretical. Specifically, we need to predict the physician’s PAC rate for each of the 
chronic conditions, given the physician’s investment to avoid PACs and the characteristics 
of the population. To make this prediction, we posit the following equation:
Where:
  •  Min PAC rate = the minimum possible PAC rate achievable for the chronic condition. 
This number should always be above 0 percent, because even with the physician’s 
best efforts, some patients will still experience PACs. The current ECR Estimator 
assumes 5 percent for all chronic conditions.
  •  Max PAC rate = the maximum PAC rate for the chronic condition. The model assumes 
that the physician’s maximum PAC rate is equal to the physician’s current PAC rate. 
This assumption is based on the belief that, even if a physician gets no better at 
avoiding PACs under PROMETHEUS, he or she will get no worse. Current average 
PAC rates are observable in the commercial insurance database, as follows, and these 
are used for the Max PAC Rate in the model:
Hypertension – 29% ›
Coronary Artery Disease – 28%  ›
Diabetes – 67% ›
Asthma – 31% ›
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease – 44% ›
Congestive Heart Failure – 67% ›
  •  PAC Avoidance Effort = the percentage of the potential bonus that the physician 
invests in reducing the PAC rate (including both fixed and variable investments). 
This is admittedly a difficult variable to quantify, and our method may not capture 
intangible efforts by the physician. However, real quality improvement will demand 
new systems and tools, and these require financial investment. The maximum PAC 
Avoidance Effort is 100 percent. However, physicians will not want to make this level 
of effort, as it would mean all of the potential bonus has been expended. 
Predicted PAC Rate = Min PAC Rate + (Max PAC Rate - Min PAC Rate) * (1 - PAC Avoidance Effort)^Factor + Risk Adjustment
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  •  Factor = a number that reflects the non-linearity of effort to reduce PACs. We believe 
that there will be diminishing returns on investment as the PAC rate approaches 
the minimum. In other words, some PACs may be easily avoidable, and these will 
yield to even modest investments. The next round of PAC avoidance will be harder 
to achieve and will require more investment and so on. For the model we have set 
the Factor value at 2, though future research may help to calculate a more precise 
value.
  •  Risk Adjustment = Any increase/decrease in the PAC rate due to riskier/less risky 
patients.5
The graph at right illustrates the PAC reduction curve as a function of PAC Avoidance 
Effort using the following values:
  • Min PAC Rate = 5%
  • Max PAC Rate = 50%
  • Factor = 2
  • Risk Adjustment = 0%
As stated earlier, we recognize that this 
is a theoretical model, and that reality 
may differ in terms of the parameters 
and values of the equation. In some 
ways, this equation addresses the 
great unknown of health care quality 
improvement: how do investments in 
systems of care translate into actual im-
provements in patient outcomes and cost 
reduction?  While we cannot claim that 
our PAC rate equation answers this 
question definitively, we do assert that 
it has the correct properties that one 
would expect from any such equation. 
These properties are:
  •  The max PAC rate is the current PAC rate, since physicians won’t get worse at 
avoiding PACs under a payment system that rewards them for reducing PACs.
  • The minimum PAC rate is above zero –physicians cannot prevent every PAC. 
!
5 In our model, the method of calculating PAC avoidance effort already adjust for risk, so we don’t add any additional risk adjustment values (though we have 
constructed the model to accept such values as new evidence emergences).  To see how PAC avoidance effort already includes risk adjustment, consider the 
following example: Two physicians are each treating a population of diabetics.  Physician A has a bonus potential of $200,000.  Physician B has a riskier population 
and a bonus potential of $250,000.  Each physician invests $50,000 to prevent PACs.  Physician A’s PAC avoidance effort = 50,000/200,000 = 25%.  Physician B’s 
PAC avoidance effort = 50,000/250,000 = 20%.  Feeding these values into the PAC prediction equation, we find that Physician A has a predicted PAC rate of 40%, 
while Physician B is expected to have a 45% PAC rate.  The equation has accounted for the difference in risk. 
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  •  The predicted PAC rate is a function of how much the physician invests in avoiding 
PACs. This is a non-linear relationship, with diminishing returns as the PAC rate 
approaches the lower limit.
  • The PAC rate is adjusted based on the riskiness of the population.
We now have all the components we need to operate the model:
  •  A population of 500 chronically ill patients
  •  A method to predict payment for each patient based on their risk profile:
 - FFS payment
 - PROMETHEUS ECR payment
 - The difference between FFS and ECR is the “potential bonus”
  •  A method to predict the PAC rate and costs within the population as a function of 
the physician’s efforts to reduce the PAC rate.
We set up the model to run through 1,000 iterations. In each iteration, the physician’s 
investment in avoiding PACs varied randomly between $0 and $500,000. Recall that the 
average total bonus potential was about $540,000. A physician investing $0 would be 
making no effort to reduce PACs, while a $500,000 investment would represent a very 
significant effort, as it would consume almost the entire potential bonus. Each iteration 
of the model also generated a new patient population; while the underlying prob-
abilities remained the same, random variation meant that some patient populations had 
more risk factors present than others. While such riskier populations have higher bonus 
potentials than average populations (because PROMETHEUS ECRs are adjusted based 
on patient risk and complexity), they also have a higher probability of PACs and the 
higher costs associated with PACs. 
For each iteration, the key output was the physician’s net bonus. Recall that the potential 
bonus is the difference between the PROMETHEUS ECR payments for all the patients 
and what the physician would have received under FFS payment. The net bonus is the 
potential bonus minus any investments the physicians makes to prevent PACs and any 
costs for treating those PACs that do occur.  Over 1,000 iterations, the average net bonus 
was about $57,500, with a standard deviation of $43,000. The maximum net bonus was 
$105,000, and the worst outcome was negative $64,000 (that is, in that iteration the 
physician was $64,000 worse off than under FFS.) These initial results suggest a high 
volatility, with the standard deviation being very large.
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What is driving this volatility? 
First, one might look at 
population risk. Are physicians 
that have a riskier population 
losing money, while physicians 
lucky enough to get a healthy 
population making money? A 
glance at the scatter plot at right 
shows that this is not the case. In 
the graph, each point represents 
one of the 1,000 iterations of the 
model. The x-axis is a count of 
the total number of risk factors in 
the population; more risk factors 
means a riskier population with 
a higher probability of PACs. 
The y-axis is the physicians net 
bonus. Visual examination of 
the scatter plot suggests there is 
little if any relationship between 
the x and y variables (and this 
conclusion is confirmed by the 
very low r-square number). It 
appears that PROMETHEUS 
Payment’s adjustment for riskier patients is fulfilling its purpose, and physicians are not 
better or worse off with a less risky/riskier patient population.
If population risk is not driving the variation in net bonus, then what is?  Next we look at 
the physician’s efforts to prevent PACs. Here, a clear pattern emerges, as illustrated in the 
scatter plot on the following page. As before, each dot represents one of the 1,000 itera-
tions of the model. In this graph, the x-axis is the physician’s investment to reduce PACs 
(which is one of the inputs for our PAC prediction equation). The y-axis is the physician’s 
net bonus. There is an obvious connection between these two variables, following a 
curve that peaks around $240,000 on the x-axis.  Note that the upper and lower limits of 
the curve are the same as in the previous scatter plot. In fact, each dot in this scatter plot 
has a counterpart in the previous graph, since they are the results of the same iterations 
of the model. The difference is that using PAC Prevention Investment as the explanatory 
variable results in a clear pattern not present when we looked at risk factors.
!
!
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What is producing this pattern? The answer is that at very low PAC prevention efforts, 
the PAC rate is not reduced significantly, and the physician ends up spending a lot of 
money treating PACs, which consumes most of the potential bonus. As the physician’s 
PAC prevention efforts increase, the PAC rates and costs go down, so the net bonus in-
creases. However, past a certain point, the physician is spending too much on reducing 
PACs. That is, the money spent preventing PACs is more than the money it would cost 
to treat the PACs themselves. It is past this point where the curve begins to slope down-
ward (and crosses into negative numbers when the PAC prevention investment is very 
high). A physician operating under a PROMETHEUS-type payment system would seek 
to optimize his PAC prevention investment to balance the cost of PACs versus the cost 
of avoiding them. Given the parameters we have used for the model, the optimal PAC 
prevention investment for a physician treating a typical population of 500 chronically ill 
patients is about $240,000 (the peak of the curve). 
Armed with this knowledge, we 
can then ask: what is the volatility 
of the physician’s net bonus when 
the PAC prevention investment 
is optimized? The answer to this 
question, we ran another thousand 
iterations of the model, setting 
the PAC prevention investment 
to $240,000 (instead of allowing 
it to vary randomly). The results 
of this simulation are illustrated 
at right. The average net bonus 
was $102,000 (which is very close 
to the maximum net bonus we 
observed for the previous simulation). Perhaps more importantly, the standard deviation 
was $2,350, suggesting that physicians who optimize their PAC prevention efforts would 
have a high confidence of achieving the average net bonus +/- $6,000.
Overall, the results of the model support the idea that PROMETHEUS ECR payment can:
  •  Align payment so that physicians have an incentive to keep patients healthy and out 
of the hospital;
  • Adjust for risk so that physicians do not have an incentive to avoid riskier patients;
  • Increase physician payment while yielding net savings from fewer complications.
!
